Reframing Patent Remedies by Sandrik, Karen E.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 67 
Number 1 Volume 67 Number 1 (Fall 2012) 
Eleventh Circuit Issue 
Article 5 
10-1-2012 
Reframing Patent Remedies 
Karen E. Sandrik 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Karen E. Sandrik, Reframing Patent Remedies , 67 U. Miami L. Rev. 95 (2002) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol67/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 




The strength of the patent system is waning. The Supreme Court
recently opened the door for dramatic change by rejecting the long-
standing presumption that a permanent injunction should issue upon the
adjudication of a valid and infringed patent. Federal courts have since
refashioned patent remedies to favor monetary liability for patent
infringement, resulting in the restructuring of substantive rights for cer-
tain classes of patent holders. In particular, some patent holders have
nearly lost their right to require consent prior to the use of their pat-
ented technology. This is a troubling development. If a patent holder is
unable to enforce its right to exclude, there is little preventing an inter-
ested user from acting unilaterally. Simply, the interested user will take
what it wants without first seeking permission from the patent holder.
In this Article, I argue that patent law should look to the law of
trespass to regain the strength of its property roots as well as a predict-
able framework for the occasions that merit a switch from a property
rule to a liability rule. Under the proposed framework, the vast majority
of patent holders will reestablish their right to exclude infringers. How-
ever, in the event that a patent holder abuses its monopolistic leverage
to unreasonably cause harm to the public, an incomplete privilege will
extend to the infringer. This incomplete privilege will function the same
way a defense of necessity does in trespass, allowing the infringer
access to the patented technology without the ordinary threat of a pen-
alty. Permitting the infringer a limited amount of time to design around
the patented technology or come up with alternative technology will fur-
ther innovation, as well as refocus courts on how the public is affected
by the gain or loss of the patented technology. This recognition of the
public's interest while still valuing a patent holder's right to exclude
will reinvigorate the current patent system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The strength of the patent system and the incentive to invest in it is
diminishing. This remains so despite the recently passed Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act ("Act"). This Act is intended to boost American
innovation and give inventors a competitive twenty-first century patent
system.' Most notably, however, the Act fails to address patent reme-
dies. It also does not address the recent shift toward monetary liability
that has resulted in the restructuring of substantive rights for certain pat-
ent holders. Consequently, a new rule has emerged: some patent holders
have reduced access to remedies.
The starting point here is that the Patent Act grants one right to all
qualifying inventors-the right to exclude others from its invention.2
When enforcing this right to exclude, an inventor often asks for a perma-
nent injunction against an adjudicated infringer and, until recently,
courts employed a presumption in favor of granting the requested
injunction.3 The Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange L.L.C.
rejected this presumption and instructed federal courts to employ a four-
factor test for injunctive relief.4 This rule change was made in large part
1. See Press Release, Senator Patrick Leahy, Comment of Senator Leahy on the Senate
Motion to Proceed to the America Invents Act (Aug. 2, 2011), available at http://www.leahy.
senate.gov/press/comment-of-senator-leahy-on-the-senate-moion-to-proceed-to-the-america-
invents-act.
2. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).
3. See infra Section II.B. and accompanying notes.
4. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393-94 (2006). The four factors
that a patentee must demonstrate in order to receive a permanent injunction against an infringer
are:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such
as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3), that,
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy




because of the growing concern regarding the conduct of many nonprac-
ticing entities ("NPEs").5 An NPE is a patent holder that demands a
licensing fee or royalty based on its patented technology, but does not
actually use this technology itself to provide an end product or service.
NPEs receive strong criticism from patent commentators, although
recent research demonstrates that these patent holders also play an
important role in the innovation economy. For example, NPEs may
serve as the intermediary between inventors and the users of technology
as well as provide liquidity and needed market clearing.7 Even with this
role, however, patent commentators are most concerned when NPEs
strategically delay in agreeing to license their technology in hopes of
demanding a royalty that not only reflects the value of the patented tech-
nology, but also a premium for holding out.8 The Supreme Court sent a
strong message in eBay to patent holders who were bottlenecking the
industry: if you hold out and hold up innovation, you will not be allowed
to exclude.
Many infringers have benefited from the eBay rule change, which
allows the continued infringement of the patented technology despite the
patent holder's request for an injunction. This loss of the virtually auto-
matic right to injunctive relief has most heavily affected NPEs. Case law
in the last five years has established a near categorical rule that NPEs
cannot obtain injunctive relief. Further, the ruling in eBay has prompted
courts to similarly establish an unofficial presumption that some practic-
ing patent holders-those that do not directly compete in the same mar-
ket with their infringers-will likewise be unable to enjoin their
infringers. The result of this is that some patent holders are protected by
a so-called liability rule and other patent holders by a property rule.
In short, a liability rule allows for a nonconsensual taking of an
5. See id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("An industry has developed in which firms use
patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining
licensing fees. For these firms, an injunction, and the potentially serious sanctions arising from its
violation, can be employed as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to
buy licenses to practice the patent."(intemal citation omitted)). The more pejorative term for an
NPE is the so-called "patent troll." See John M. Golden, Commentary, "Patent Trolls" and Patent
Remedies, 85 TEx. L. REv. 2111, 2112 (2007); Sannu K. Shrestha, Trolls or Market-Makers? An
Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 115 (2010).
6. See Golden, supra note 5, at 2112 (noting that trolls charge "a price for authorizing the
work of others"); see also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking,
85 TEx. L. REv. 1991, 2009 (2007) ("Defining a patent troll has proven a tricky business, but that
does not mean the problem does not exist.").
7. James F. McDonough HI, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of
the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190 (2006). See also
Shrestha, supra note 5, at 118.
8. See Christopher M. Newman, Patent Infringement as Nuisance, 59 CATH. U. L. REv. 61,
62-63 (2009).
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entitlement (for example, the right to pollute) in exchange for a later
payment of money damages.9 The amount of money to be paid to the
entitlement holder is determined by prices that are most typically set by
a court. '0 Under this "take now, pay later" rule, interested users or takers
of a particular entitlement can unilaterally act so long as they pay the
officially determined price for that entitlement." This necessarily
assumes that the court is aware of this taking. A court will then also
decide in the instance of a conflicting use which use is preferred. 12 A
property rule, or "absolute permission rule," protects the right to exclude
and is heavily employed in property law.' 3 This rule mandates that the
entitlement holder, not a court, is the one who decides whether the enti-
tlement is for sale or use and at what price. 4 The entitlement holder's
right to decide how much the entitlement is worth is enforced in law
through the use of injunctions and punitive damages.15 These enforce-
ment mechanisms encourage interested parties to negotiate directly with
the entitlement holder. 6
Although it appears that NPEs and practicing patent holders in indi-
rect competition with their infringers are now governed by a liability
rule, patent law is not most accurately or desirably described as a "take
now, pay later" system. The Patent Act requires an interested user to
first obtain permission from the patent holder before any use is made of
the patented technology. If the patent holder does not consent to the use
of its technology but the interested user decides to ignore this refusal and
9. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105-06 (1972). "In the
context of Coasean bargaining, the term 'entitlement' can mean anything from the right to pollute
to the right to exclude entry to one's real property." Amelia Smith Rinehart, Contracting Patents:
A Modem Patent Exhaustion Doctrine, 23 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 483, 504 n. 114 (2010) (citation
omitted).
10. See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1720 (2004)
[hereinafter Smith, Property and Property Rules].
11. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1302 (1996) [hereinafter Merges,
Contracting into Liability Rules]. Merges finds that property rules are best described as "absolute
permission rules" and liability rules as "take now, pay later" rules. Id. For a most interesting reply
to Merges, see Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 100 CALIF. L. REv. 463,
464-65 (2012) [hereinafter Lemley, Contracting Around] (arguing that parties contract around
inefficient liability rules just like parties contract around inefficient property rules).
12. See also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L.
Ruv. 965, 974, 996 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules] (explaining that
nuisance law has transitioned from a pure exclusionary system to one where courts evaluate the
reasonableness of property use in deciding to allow a liability rule to protect the entitlement).
13. See Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 12, at 1302.
14. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1105.
15. See Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1720.
16. See id. at 1720, 1732 (explaining that property rules have long been preferred in the law
and are enforced through injunctions and supracompensatory damages).
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infringe the patent, then this user may be classified in patent law as a
"willful" infringer. This distinction of a willful infringer means that a
court may enhance the compensatory damages up to three times the
original amount. In essence, the willful infringer has subjected itself to a
possible penalty. Courts since eBay have brought tension in the system
with this shift to a liability rule when also dealing with willful infringers.
This tension occurs when an infringer is deemed a willful one that may
be subject to enhanced damages, but then that same willful infringer is
allowed to continue infringing the patented technology.
In this Article, I argue that patent law can decrease this tension by
looking to the law of trespass for guidance on how to best handle NPEs
when they strategically engage in holdout behavior that stalls innova-
tion. In short, the law of trespass shows how property rule protection and
enforcement can effectively and efficiently handle the potential for
holdout without sacrificing a patent holder's right to exclude. In looking
to this common law system for guidance, "[a] unified theory of prop-
erty-one broad enough to account for the similarities and differences
among species of property as diverse as Blackacre and patents-
promises to increase rather than to diminish our understanding of prop-
erty and intellectual property."17
Under this infringement-as-trespass framework, most patent hold-
ers will be able to reestablish the right to exclude. Yet like in the law of
trespass, patent law provides fertile ground for harmful holdouts. Courts
must be both cognizant of this potential harm and of the distinction
between patent holder behavior that is unreasonable and that of hard,
legitimate bargaining.' 8 When courts are faced with harmful patent
holder behavior, they can use two readily available mechanisms under
my proposed framework.
17. John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L.
REv. 1077, 1078 (2005) (emphasis omitted). See also Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of
Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REv.
455, 458 (2010) [hereinafter Epstein, Disintegration] (explaining that "huge returns lie from
systematizing intellectual property by analogy and extension to successful legal regimes
elsewhere"). This is an unsurprisingly analogy because patents have long been classified as
property. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642
(1999) ("Patents ... have long been considered a species of property."). See also Adam Mossoff,
Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 322 (2009) ("The status
of patents is undisputed: patents are property."). Compare Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1031, 1075 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley, Free Riding]
(explaining that intellectual property law stands on its own and that property analogies are not
helpful), with John F. Duffy, supra, at 1078 (disagreeing with Lemley and arguing that intellectual
property fits within the broader category of property).
18. See Anne Layne-Farrar & Klaus M. Schmidt, Licensing Complementary Patents: "Patent
Trolls," Market Structure, and "Excessive" Royalties, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1121, 1122
(2010).
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The first mechanism is the grant of an incomplete privilege. In tres-
pass, the defense of necessity limits the right to exclude. A situation of
private or public necessity occurs when a grave danger is presented and
an actor violates the laws of property in order to avoid such danger. 19In
this situation, the court will switch from a property rule to a liability rule
and, in doing so, allow the violator to simply pay the price for the harm
it caused (instead of also paying a penalty for the intentional violation).
Similarly, patent law should allow for the issuance of an incomplete
privilege when a court determines that a patent holder is using its lever-
age in a way that will cause unreasonable and significant harm to the
public. The issued incomplete privilege will allow the infringer to con-
tinue using the patent until it has sufficient time to begin designing
around the patent or take the infringing component out of production
and the market. If this is not reasonably possible, then the court may
issue the incomplete privilege for the remainder of the patent term.
Under this incomplete privilege, the infringer will pay for its continued
use of the patented technology.
A court-ordered stay is a second mechanism that may be used in
less compelling situations of harmful patent holder conduct that never-
theless requires some intervention. Courts often stay litigation while a
patent is in reexamination by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office ("USPTO") and have also delayed the effective date of an injunc-
tion.20 A court-ordered stay is a relatively familiar idea in patent law
when paired with injunctions.2" In this Article, I propose that this mech-
anism be used more frequently to ensure that the foundation of patent
law is not disturbed and to encourage further innovation by the process
of designing around the patent at issue.
Overall, this trespass framework will rebalance the structure of pat-
ent remedies within the patent system, while still addressing the poten-
tial harm of NPEs and limiting the circumstances that will stall
innovation. Section II lays the foundation for this Article by explaining
enhanced and injunctive damages, and concludes by highlighting the
tension that occurs when a willful infringer is allowed to continue
infringing despite the patent holder's protests. Section III then briefly
discusses the differences between liability rules and property rules and
employs the systems of nuisance and trespass to demonstrate these dif-
ferences. Section IV argues that a patent holder's right to exclude must
19. See infra Section II.B.2.
20. See i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831,864 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (delaying the
onset of a permanent inunction); MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 563
(E.D. Va. 2007) (explaining that "court[s] ha[ve] broad discretion to grant or deny a stay pending
PTO reexamination of the patents-in-suit").
21. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 2035-39.
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be preserved for the maintenance of a strong patent system. The law of
trespass exemplifies such a system. Section IV also discusses the possi-
ble remedial options to solve the tension in the patent remedies system
after eBay and argues that the most satisfactory and feasible option is to
work within the rule of eBay. Finally, Section IV presents suggestions
for how to reframe the remedies used by courts that will still recognize
and minimize the potential for patent holdup. Section V concludes.
II. JUDICIAL REMEDIES AFFECT SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
Patent law is unique. In exchange for the public disclosure of a
new, useful, and non-obvious invention, a patent holder, or "patentee,"
receives the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the
disclosed invention for the term of the patent.22 Built into this statement,
there are at least three separate bodies of law at work: the Patent Act,
property law, and tort law. 23 The Patent Act sets forth the principles of
patent law, as well as the remedies available to a patent holder. The
Patent Act and resulting patent law is justified as a utilitarian institution
by the United States Constitution, which grants Congress the right to
create patent laws to "promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts."24 Yet within this institution and its utilitarian considerations justi-
fying it as a whole, tort and property law dictate and justify certain
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), (c) (2006) (prohibiting any person from making, using, offering
to sell, or selling a patented invention, within the United States or imported into the United States,
without authority from the patentee); Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 12
(1966) (stating that the three patentability requirements are non-obviousness, utility, and novelty);
23. "Patent law is not an island separated from the main body of American jurisprudence."
Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2004) (en banc) (Dyk, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A possible fourth and fifth
body of law is that of public administrative law and contract law. See Joseph Scott Miller, Joint
Defense or Research Joint Venture? Reassessing the Patent-Challenge-Bloc's Antitrust Status,
2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 11 (2011), http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/miller-joint-defense.pdf ("A
patent, unlike the typical contract or tort, affects the rights and obligations of everyone in the
United States who would practice the technology claimed in it. Patents are, in this sense,
nationwide regulations."); see also F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for
Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 699 (2001) [hereinafter Kieff, Property
Rights] (explaining "that patent law can function as a public policy tool for promoting national
economic growth").
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing
Inventions and the Utilitarian Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 897, 901
(2009) ("Almost all commentators and judges agree that utilitarian considerations enjoy
hegemonic status in patent jurisprudence ...."); Kieff, Property Rights, supra note 23, at 698
(finding that the "consensus among those studying the American patent system is to focus on
utilitarian approaches"); Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in
2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICs: CrvtL LAW AND ECONOMICS 129, 130 (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) ("The United States Constitution expressly conditions
the grant of power to Congress to create patent and copyright laws upon a utilitarian foundation
.... .).
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actions and principles of patent law.2 5
Property law helps define the rights of patent holders and users in
relation to a particular patent.26 Tort law helps define the conduct of
patent holders and users. 27 Further, patent and tort remedies largely mir-
ror one another in that the goal of both remedial structures is to restore
the aggrieved party to the status quo ante.28 Patent remedies are
designed "to compensate patent owners for their losses, putting them
back in the world they would have inhabited but for infringement. 29
Similar to a party injured in tort law, Congress, courts, and scholars
alike have historically stated that a patent holder should be "made
whole" for past infringement.3 0 The significance of placing the injured
patent holder back in the position enjoyed prior to the infringement is
founded on the traditional conception of patent protection-that the
right to exclude increases profits and incentives for others to invent.3'
The act of infringement is a strict liability tort;32 if one crosses the
25. John Rawls articulated this distinction between justifying an institution and justifying a
particular action that falls under the institution in his paper, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV.
3 (1955). Rawls uses criminal law to demonstrate this distinction, arguing that utilitarian
considerations justify the institution of punishment, while retributivist concerns control and justify
a decision to punish a particular crime in a particular way. Id. at 4-5. This understanding of how
two separate and distinct concepts of rules within one system is helpful for patent law. Patent
remedies are designed to place the patent holder in the position it would have been if the
infringement never occurred, yet patent remedies are necessarily intertwined with the public
interest. See CRAIG ALLEN NARD & R. POLK WAGNER, PATENT LAW 204 (2008). The court must
therefore have concern not only about the patent holder's interest, but also the best remedy in light
of the public benefit of the disclosed patent. See id.
26. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642
(1999) ("Patents ... have long been considered a species of property."); see also Mossoff, supra
note 17, at 322. Mossoff explains that the statement that patents are property "may sound
surprising, because legal rights derived from constitutional provisions are typically the subject of
substantial disagreement on both descriptive and normative grounds.... [but this is] [n]ot so for
constitutionally-based patents, which Congress, courts, treatise authors, and scholars agree are a
unique form of property that secure only a negative right to exclude others from an invention." Id.
27. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 7 (2000) (stating generally that tort law is
centered on people's conduct).
28. Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of 'Private Law' Remedies 2-3 (San Diego Legal
Studies Paper, No. 11-077, 2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1932834.
29. Mark A. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits from Reasonable Royalties, 51 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 655, 674 (2009) [hereinafter Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits]; but see Lemley,
Free Riding, supra note 17, at 1065 (arguing that intellectual property rights should be granted
"only to the extent necessary to enable creators to cover their average fixed costs"); Sichelman,
supra note 28, at 28-30 (arguing patentees should only be compensated the amount needed to
keep them inventing).
30. Sichelman, supra note 28, at 14 (stating that "like an injured party in tort, Congress has
legislated, and courts have held, that patentees are entitled to be 'made whole' for any past
infringement, with damages compensating them for the full extent of the 'harm' inflicted upon
them by an infringer").
31. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits, supra note 29, at 657.
32. See Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("Patent
infringement is a tort." (citation omitted)), mandate recalled and amended by 557 F.3d 1377 (Fed.
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boundary lines of the patent, as defined by the patent claims, infringe-
ment has occurred.33 This robust protection of the patentee's right to
exclude "explains why the normal remedy for infringement of a patent is
an injunction against continued infringement. 34
Prior to receiving an injunction, however, and after a finding of
infringement, the patentee is entitled to receive "damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable
royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer. . . ."'I Courts
have interpreted this section to authorize two categories of base dam-
ages.36 The first category is lost profits and the second is reasonable
royalties.37
Briefly, lost profits allow patentees to receive the profits they
would have made, requiring patentees to demonstrate a causal connec-
tion between the infringement and the lost profits.38 The lost profits
inquiry is controlled by two familiar tests from tort law: "but for" and
"proximate causation." In essence, the lost profits category determines
whether the claimed lost profits are based on the reasonably foreseeable
consequences of the defendant's infringement, or whether they are too
Cir. 2009); Jurgens v. CBK Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that patent
infringement "is a strict liability offense" (citation omitted)); see also Michael L. Rustad, Torts as
Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 514 (2011) ("Patent and copyright have long been regarded
as creatures of federal statute, but infringement was historically considered to be a tort. For
instance, the infringement of a patent was classifiable as a tort-namely, trespass on the case.").
33. See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 642 (1915) ("As the
exclusive right conferred by a patent is property and infringement of it is a tortuous taking of a
part of that property, the normal measure of damages is the value of what was taken .... "); see
also Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
108, 109 (1990) ("Patents give a right to exclude, just as the law of trespass does with real
property."). There is no defense of independent creation or lack of intent. See Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999) ("Actions
predicated on direct patent infringement . . . do not require any showing of intent to infringe;
instead, knowledge and intent are considered only with respect to damages." (citation omitted)).
34. Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits, supra note 29, at 657 ("The traditional conception of
patent protection is to give patent owners a means of excluding competitors from selling the
patented product, thereby increasing their profits and therefore the incentive of putative patent
owners to invent. This traditional conception requires exclusivity .... "). See also DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02[l] (2008) ("A patent . . . grants to the patentee and his
assigns the right to exclude others from making, using, and selling the invention. It does not grant
the affirmative right to make, use or sell.").
35. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2011).
36. See David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U.
L. REV. 127, 132 (2009) (citation omitted).
37. Id. (citation omitted).
38. Id. at 132-33 ("In all cases, the patentee must prove causation connecting the
infringement and the lost profits."). More precisely, the Federal Circuit requires a patentee prove
"( 1) the extent of demand for the patented product, (2) the absence of noninfringing substitutes for
that product, (3) the patentee's ability to meet the additional demand by expanding manufacturing
capacity, and (4) the extent of profits the patentee would have made." Lemley, Distinguishing Lost
Profits, supra note 29, at 657.
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remote or indirect to be pinned on the defendant's actions. Lost profits
fit best within patent law's remedial goal to put the patentees in the same
position they would have enjoyed but for the infringement.39
Yet oftentimes a patent holder cannot prove that it suffered any lost
profits as a result of the defendant's infringement.4" In this instance, the
court turns to the second category of patent damages-reasonable royal-
ties.41 This serves as the floor that the court may not go below and com-
pensates the patent holder for the value of the use that the infringer
received from the patent holder's invention.42
A. Tension Between Enhanced Damages and Equitable Relief
In addition to these base monetary damages, the patentee may also
receive enhanced damages.43 And finally, the patentee may request per-
manent injunctive relief from the defendant's infringement and attor-
ney's fees. 4 The following sections will provide a brief primer on
enhanced damages and permanent injunctive relief. As explained below,
the two are currently in tension with each other because of recent case
law where enhanced damages are awarded but injunctive relief is not.
1. ENHANCED DAMAGES
It is a long-standing principle in patent law that a harsher punish-
ment will be given to those who intentionally infringe compared to those
who innocently or unknowingly infringe.45 Section 284 of the Patent Act
39. See Lemley, Distinguishing Lost Profits, supra note 29, at 657.
40. See id. at 655.
41. See id.
42. See id. Reasonable royalties are designed like lost profits to compensate patentees for
their losses; yet, making the patentee whole here is different because in most cases the patentee is
not competing in the market. See id. at 655-56. Instead, these NPEs are only interested in selling
the rights to the patented technology. See also Opderbeck, supra note 36, at 133. There are two
ways that reasonable royalty damages may be calculated. "The first is the 'analytical approach,'
under which the infringer's profit projections relating to the infringing product or process are
apportioned between the patentee and infringer. The second is the 'willing licensor-willing
licensee' approach. This approach imagines a hypothetical negotiation between the patentee as a
willing licensor and a willing licensee." Id. (citations omitted).
43. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
44. See id. §§ 283, 285.
45. See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1089 (2003). The infringer's state of mind is only important in
regards to enhanced damages. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999) (citation omitted). Patent infringement is a strict liability offense
in general, so even without knowledge and even with independent creation of the same or similar
invention, one can be liable for infringement. See, e.g., Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F.
Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968). See also generally Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict
Liability and its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L J. 799, 800 (2002) ("Patent
infringement is a strict liability tort in the sense that a defendant may be liable without having had
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grants courts the discretion to enhance damages up to three times the
amount of the base or compensatory award.46 The Patent Act does not
provide guidance as to when courts may treble damages, but the Federal
Circuit has interpreted § 284 to require a finding of willful infringement
before the enhancement of the patentee's compensatory damages.47 The
Federal Circuit has also established that "enhanced damages may be
awarded only as a penalty for an infringer's increased culpability,
namely willful infringement."48 The penalty of supracompensatory dam-
ages due to a finding of willfulness in patent law is imposed as an "an
economic deterrent to the tort of infringement."'4 9
The term of art, "willful," was explained in the Federal Circuit
opinion In re Seagate Technology, L.L.C.. 5o The Federal Circuit created
a two-part test for determining when an actor has engaged in willful
infringement of a valid patent.5 The first part requires the patent owner
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted
despite an "objectively high likelihood" that it would infringe the patent
at issue.52 The second part requires the patent holder to prove that the
any notice, prior to the filing of an infringement action, that her conduct was infringing."
(citations omitted)).
46. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
47. See Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 792 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("Willfulness of the
infringement is the sole basis for the court's exercise of its discretion to enhance damages under
35 U.SC. § 284 (1988)."). See also In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (holding that "proof of willful infringement permitting enhanced damages requires at least a
showing of objective recklessness.").
48. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1348
(Fed. Cir. 2004). Consequently, enhanced damages have been termed punitive damages. See
Beatrice Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir.
1991). See also Applera Corp. v. MJ Research Inc., 372 F. Supp. 2d 233, 235 (D. Conn. 2005)
("The purpose of an enhanced damages award is punitive, and is meant to punish behavior.., that
is properly characterized as 'reprehensible' or 'egregious.'" (citing Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at
1348)).
49. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1126 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See also
Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342 ("The concept of 'willful infringement' is not simply a conduit
for enhancement of damages; it is a statement that patent infringement, like other civil wrongs, is
disfavored, and intentional disregard of legal rights warrants deterrence."). As another monetary
deterrent, many courts conclude that a finding of willful infringement will also mean that the
patentee has met the burden for proving the infringement to be an "exceptional case." See, e.g.,
Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1987). The
significance of proving an "exceptional case[ ]" is that the patentee will also be awarded its
attorney's fees at the infringer's cost. 35 U.S.C. § 285.
50. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370-72. For a thorough discussion of the standards prior to
Seagate, see Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement and Enhanced Damages After In
re Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IowA L. REv. 417, 423-28 (2012).
51. See Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
52. Id. ("The state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant to this objective inquiry.").
Presumably the Seagate court here meant for this part of its test to be judged by something akin to
the reasonable person standard that is used in tort law. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt. a (2005) ("Conduct that displays reasonable care
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risk of infringing a valid patent was so obvious that it was known or
should have been known to the actor. 3
Prior to the willfulness standard set in Seagate, the Federal Circuit
asked simply whether an accused infringer had "prudently conduct[ed]
himself with any confidence that a court might hold the patent invalid or
not infringed. 54 One of the problems with this low standard of willful-
ness is that "actual knowledge" of the patent was not required.55 This
pre-Seagate standard of willfulness conflicted with the traditional defini-
tion of "'willful' in tort law[:] .. .disregard[] [of] a known risk of a
highly likely result. ' 56 Many patent scholars and commentators opined
that the standard set in Seagate-defining willfulness as requiring objec-
tively reckless conduct instead of merely negligent conduct-would
result in fewer findings of willful infringement and, therefore, fewer
awards of enhanced damages.57 Yet in a recent empirical study, it is
reported that willfulness findings have only decreased by about ten per-
is the same as conduct that is reasonable, conduct that shows 'ordinary care,' conduct that avoids
creating an 'unreasonable risk of harm,' and conduct that shows 'reasonable prudence.' . . . [A]
'reasonably careful person' (or a 'reasonably prudent person') is one who acts with reasonable
care ...."); 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 133 (2004) ("The standard of care [in tort law] is
often stated as the 'reasonably prudent person standard' . . . . With adults, all of whom are
presumed by the law to have adequate experience, intelligence, and maturity to act reasonably, the
objective test for negligence is normally stated simply in terms of the reasonably prudent
person.").
53. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
54. State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Seaman, supra note 50, at 425. Another motivation of the Seagate court here in setting
this objectively-high reckless standard was to get rid of the previous negligence-based standard.
See Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371. Prior to Seagate, a potential infringer had an "affirmative duty to
exercise due care," which included a duty to obtain a written opinion of counsel before the
accused infringer engaged in any possible infringing behavior. Id. at 1368-69. The most troubling
aspect of this standard was that the accused infringer was often forced to disclose this opinion in
court in order to prove it exercised due care in its conduct. See id. at 1368-70. This meant that the
accused infringer waived its attorney-client privilege. See id.; see also Lemley & Tangri, supra
note 45, at 1087 (stating that "the accused infringer [would] have to waive its attorney-client
privilege in virtually every case"). Much ink was spent discussing the conundrums of this
standard, which the Federal Circuit took note of in altering the standard accompanying punitive
patent damages. See Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368-71. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit held that with
the introduction of the objectively-high reckless standard, it was abandoning the previous
affirmative duty of care standard. Id. at 1371. Moreover, the Federal Circuit stated it was likewise
abandoning the affirmative requirement to receive an opinion from legal counsel prior to engaging
in potentially infringing behavior. Id.
56. Seaman, supra note 50, at 425 & n.57 (a finding of willfulness in tort law occurs "when
an 'actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to
him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly
probable that harm would follow"' (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS § 34 (1971))).
57. Seaman, supra note 50, at 431-32 (citing examples).
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cent (a change that was not statistically significant).58
Underlying the willfulness evaluation is the idea that "the doctrine
of willfulness is dynamic." 9 This means that the actor's conduct will be
judged throughout the stages of its potential infringement and that an
innocent infringer may become a willful infringer during litigation upon
learning that it is in fact infringing a valid patent.6 ° This is most signifi-
cant when a court is faced with a permanent injunction motion.
2. PERMANENT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
After a patentee receives base monetary damages, and potentially
enhanced damages if the infringement is deemed willful, the patentee
will likely request permanent injunctive relief from the infringement. An
injunction protects the right to exclude-the defining characteristic of
property.6' In patent law, the significance of the right to exclude is
grounded in the monopolistic nature of the patent;62 the patent holder
would lose the leverage normally granted in exchange for public disclo-
sure. 63 As a result, the patent holder would enjoy just a fraction of the
value its invention was intended to have under the Patent Act.64 Further-
more, an injunction encourages would-be takers or users of the technol-
ogy to negotiate up front with the patentee and "keeps open the channels
58. Id. at 420, 441 (explaining that "predictions that Seagate would have a dramatic impact
on willfulness findings in the district courts apparently were incorrect, as willfulness was found
only about 10% less often after Seagate"). Further, "[a]necdotal evidence suggests that willfulness
is still routinely alleged after Seagate, so long as the patentee has a nonsanctionable basis for
doing so." Id. at 442-43 (footnote omitted).
59. Lemley & Tangri, supra note 45, at 1093.
60. Id. (stating that "[t]he question is not simply what the accused infringer thought when it
adopted the technology, but also what it thinks at every moment since that time").
61. See Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (explaining
that "a patent is a form of property right, and the right to exclude recognized in a patent is but the
essence of the concept of property"); see also JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAw 482 (3d ed.
2009); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REv. 730, 730 (1998)
("Give someone the right to exclude others from a valued resource, i.e., a resource that is scarce
relative to the human demand for it, and you give them property. Deny someone the exclusion
right and they do not have property.").
62. See H.H. Robertson, Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 390 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(recognizing that "the principal value of a patent is its statutory right to exclude"), abrogated on
other grounds by Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
63. See Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 718 F.2d 1573, 1577-78 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("The
patent owner would lack much of the 'leverage,' afforded by the right to exclude, to enjoy the full
value of his invention in the market place. Without the right to obtain an injunction, the right to
exclude granted to the patentee would have only a fraction of the value it was intended to have,
and would no longer be as great an incentive to engage in the toils of scientific and technological
research.").
64. See id. From a competitor's viewpoint, the threat of an injunction motivates a thorough
analysis of the patent's validity and enforceability. Kieff, Property Rights, supra note 23, at 712.
A competitor will avoid both liability and being enjoined from using the patented technology if it
can prove the patent should not have been issued or should not be enforced. Id.
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for voluntary exchange." 65Although the right to exclude others from
making or using the patented technology has never been absolute, a
denial of permanent injunctive relief was a rare exception.66 This has
been true for over a hundred years, dating back to at least 1908 when the
Supreme Court explained that patents are property and that patent hold-
ers should accordingly in most instances be entitled to permanent injunc-
tive relief.67 The Federal Circuit embraced this robust protection of the
right to exclude and as a general rule would grant a permanent injunc-
tion to a requesting patent holder after the patent was proved valid and
infringed.68
However, the Supreme Court struck down the Federal Circuit's
general rule and opened the door for dramatic change in the law of equi-
table remedies in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C.6 9 The plaintiff pat-
ent holder, MercExchange, alleged that the "Buy-It-Now" feature on
eBay's online auctions infringed its patented technology.7 °
MercExchange brought suit against eBay after licensing negotiations
broke down between the two parties. 7 ' The district court found that
eBay willfully infringed MercExchange's patents, although it denied
MercExchange's request for a permanent injunction after stating that
injunctions should be weighed in equity. 72 The district court emphasized
in this decision that the patents seemed to be weak business method
patents and also that MercExchange did not itself use the patented tech-
nology. 73  The district court gave much weight to the fact that
MercExchange is an NPE; its business is based on the enforcement of
patents, rather than the use of patented technology."
65. Epstein, Disintegration, supra note 17, at 488-89 (explaining that injunctive relief (paired
with punitive damages) in theory "mak[es] it impossible for individuals to circumvent the basic
rules of property law for their short-term private advantage").
66. One of the most infamous cases is City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d
577 (7th Cir. 1934). In this case, the Seventh Circuit refused to stop the infringement even after
affirming the damages award because a permanent injunction "would close the sewage plant,
leaving the entire community without any means for the disposal of raw sewage other than
running it into Lake Michigan, thereby polluting its waters and endangering the health and lives of
that and other adjoining communities." Id. at 593.
67. See generally Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908).
68. See Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("It is the
general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound
reason for denying it."). See also MUELLER, supra note 61, at 483.
69. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). eBay's subsidiary, Half.com
was also named as defendant. Id. at 390. This article refers to both eBay and Half.com collectively
as "eBay."
70. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 719 (E.D. Va. 2003), affd
in part, rev'd in part, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
71. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 390.
72. See MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 711-15.
73. See id. at 712.
74. See id. This type of NPE is sometimes referred to pejoratively as a patent troll, culling the
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court and
reasserted its general rule that an injunction should be denied only in
very rare circumstances.75 In doing so, the Federal Circuit stated that the
patent holder's right to exclude is "the essence of the concept of prop-
erty" and that this case was not "sufficiently exceptional" to justify the
denial of prospective injunctive relief.76 Further, it explained that the
concern over the type of patents at issue and MercExchange's willing-
ness to license its patented technology did not warrant a departure from
the general rule regarding injunctive relief.77
Ultimately, the Supreme Court disagreed with both courts finding
that "[j]ust as the District Court erred in its categorical denial of injunc-
tive relief, the Court of Appeals erred in its categorical grant of such
relief."78 The Supreme Court then struck down the Federal Circuit's
general rule that an injunction should almost always be granted and
instead endorsed the district court's emphasis on weighing equitable
considerations.79 However the Supreme Court also rejected the district
court's reasoning of its decision because of the district court's improper
categorical position against issuing permanent injunctions to patent
holders that license instead of practice their patented technology.8" The
Supreme Court concluded by endorsing a four-factor test that a patent
holder must now demonstrate in order to receive a permanent injunction:
"(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3), that, considering the balance of hardships between the plain-
tiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction."8 The
imagery of a Scandinavian troll from folklore that demanded a toll for those crossing a bridge that
it did not itself build. See Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A
Novel "Cold Fusion" Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. ScI. & TECH.
407, 410-11 (2007). See also Golden, supra note 5, at 2112 (explaining that a "patent troll" is
"one of a class of patent owners who do not provide end products or services themselves, but who
do demand royalties as a price for authorizing the work of others").
75. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated,
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1339.
78. eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.
79. See id. at 393-94.
80. See id. at 393. The Court stated that self-made inventors and university research
programs are two types of NPEs that courts should be careful of when assessing injunctive relief.
Id.
81. Id. at 391, 394. For a recent and engaging explanation of the history behind the supposed
"well-established" test used in eBay and how the "brusque opinion [of eBay] has launched a
revolution in the law of equitable remedies," see Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E.
Smith, The Supreme Court's Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 203, 203 (2012).
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Supreme Court then remanded the case to the district court so that it
could apply the four-factor framework without any categorical rules.82
At the time of this decision, 2006, and for years leading up to it,
there was a growing concern in the intellectual property community that
patent holders had become overly aggressive and unreasonably strategic
in their licensing tactics. Justice Kennedy and three other justices in a
concurring opinion expressed their concerns that the general rule of
injunctive relief needed to be reconsidered in part because "[a]n industry
has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing
and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees."
8 3
Patent holders were using their patents as swords and extracting value
from their patented technology that far exceeded the true value of the
technology by engaging in unreasonable "holdup" behavior. Holdup
occurs when the patentee opportunistically leverages its right to exclude
(enforced by an injunction) over another party's interest in using the
patented technology.84 The Supreme Court sent a strong message in
eBay to patent holders who were bottlenecking the industry: if you
holdout during negotiations and holdup innovation, you won't be
allowed to exclude.
B. The Impact of eBay and Resulting Change
Although the impact of eBay is not yet fully realized, there are at
least two discernible post-eBay effects. The first is that after eBay,
courts now frequently deny injunctive relief. In a study that was con-
ducted following the one-year anniversary of eBay, it was concluded
that district courts denied permanent injunctions approximately twenty-
three percent of the time.85 Another study reports that prior to eBay dis-
trict courts granted injunctions in ninety-five percent of patent cases, and
after eBay in seventy-two percent of cases.86 And although the Supreme
82. eBay, 547 U.S. at 394.
83. Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
84. See Newman, supra note 8, at 62-63. If a technology company is putting together an
electronic product, one that requires obtaining licenses from a hundred different patent holders,
the last patent holder to agree to license the technology has a great advantage. The company has
already spent significant money and resources in developing the electronic product and obtaining
ninety-nine licenses. Because of this input, the company is likely willing to spend more to obtain
that last license than it would have spent to obtain that license earlier in the game. A patent
holder's behavior in strategically holding out until the last minute may stall innovation while the
company is not able to build upon that patented technology.
85. Virginia K. Demarchi, Injunctions after eBay v. MercExchange, FENWICK & WEST LLP
(July 31, 2007), http://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/Injunctions_- After -eBay.pdf. Out of
30 reported cases where district courts were asked to permanently enjoin an infringer, seven times
the courts refused to do so. Id.
86. See Lily Lim & Sarah E. Craven, Injunctions Enjoined: Remedies Restructured, 25 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 787, 798 (2009) (citations omitted).
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Court instructed district courts to weigh each case individually and avoid
categorical rules, "district courts have responded in apparent lockstep to
Justice Kennedy's concerns about trolls."87 In particular, NPEs are hard-
pressed to get an injunction.88 The denial of injunctive relief has also
spread to patentees that practice their technology but do not compete in
the same market as their infringers.89 The developing case law is in con-
flict with the Supreme Court's warning against the "categorical denial of
injunctive relief."9 Another area of tension within the structure of patent
remedies is in cases where a willful infringer is permitted to continue
engaging in behavior that was deemed punish-worthy.
The beginning signs of this tension between equitable and
enhanced damages are evident in the remand of eBay where the Eastern
District of Virginia was faced with implementing the four-factor test.91
The district court started the litigation by reopening discovery, allowing
each party to update the court on events occurring in the previous three
years.92 The most notable event was that the USPTO had issued non-
final office actions in the reexamination of both patents at issue indicat-
ing that each patent was invalid as obvious.9 3 Because these were non-
final but consistent findings by the USPTO, eBay filed a motion to stay
the proceedings until the USPTO issued a final ruling.94 The district
court granted the stay for one of the two patents.95 It did not stay for
both patents because a jury had already found one patent to be valid and
infringed, which was affirmed by the Federal Circuit.96 Although the
district court reopened discovery, it did not allow parties to re-litigate
previously decided issues or try to recast facts more favorably. 97 One
87. Golden, supra note 5, at 2113.
88. See id.
89. See id. ("Since the Supreme Court issued its opinion in eBay, district courts appear to
have consistently denied permanent injunctions in cases where an infringer has contested the
patent holder's request for such relief and the infringer and patent holder were not competitors.")
(citations omitted).
90. Id. at 2113-14 (quoting eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
91. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (E.D. Va. 2007).
92. Id. at 560.
93. Id. These rulings of invalidity as to both patents at issue here, once final, would be
appealable to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI") and then the Federal
Circuit. Id. at 562-63.
94. Id. at 562-63.
95. Id. at 563, 565, 567.
96. Id. at 563 ("The court reaches differing conclusions regarding the two patents due to the
vastly differing procedural postures of such discrete infringement disputes. Tellingly, unlike the
alleged infringement of the '051 patent, which never reached a jury, after a five-and-a-half week
jury trial, the '265 patent was deemed valid and [willfully] infringed ... .").See also Id. at 563-65,
67.
97. Id. at 560.
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such attempt was eBay's assertion that it had never willfully infringed
MercExchange's '265 patent. 98 The district court ignored this assertion
based upon the jury's finding that eBay was a willful infringer and the
Federal Circuit's affirmation of the finding.99 Similarly, the district court
ignored MercExchange's assertions that it had tried to commercially
develop the '265 patent and enforce its right to exclude others from
infringing. °°
The district court applied the facts of the case with the each equita-
ble factor as mandated by the Supreme Court. °1 ' The first factor-that
the plaintiff has suffered irreparable harm-weighed in favor of eBay
because the court found MercExchange's behavior inconsistent regard-
ing its willingness to license versus its desire to defend its right to
exclude. MercExchange had consistently made statements to the public
that it was seeking monetary damages and not an injunction.
10 2
MercExchange's president also made specific statements about its will-
ingness to license the patents at issue to eBay and that "the eBay com-
munity was the natural home for the patents."' 013 The court found that
this statement weakened MercExchange's assertion that it would be
"irreparably harmed" without an injunction."° MercExchange also did
not establish that injunctive relief was needed to protect intangibles such
as goodwill, reputation, and brand name.
10 5
As to the second factor-whether the remedies at law were inade-
quate-the court noted that although MercExchange had "every right"
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 560-61. The court explained that this argument contradicted the district court's
earlier and repeated findings that MercExchange demonstrated "a 'willingness to license its
patents,' a 'lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents,' and that MercExchange's
'numerous comments to the media before, during, and after th[e] trial indicat[e] that it did not seek
to enjoin eBay but rather sought appropriate damages for the infringement.'" Id. (alteration in
original) (citation omitted). Furthermore, the district court noted that, after the first trial,
MercExchange had licensed its patented technology to uBid, Inc., a direct competitor of eBay,
further demonstrating its willingness to license and lack of firm belief regarding its right to
exclude. Id. at 561.
101. See id. at 568 (stating that "this court is required to apply 'the four-factor test historically
employed by courts of equity"' (quoting eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390
(2006))).
102. For example, MercExchange's counsel stated to the media: "We are seeking reasonable
royalties as permitted under the patent laws. It's not our goal to put eBay out of business. It's our
goal to provide just compensation for the patent owner." Troy Wolverton, Patent suit could sting
eBay, CNET NEWS (Sept 5, 2002, 4:00AM), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1017-956638.html,
quoted in MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
103. Ina Steiner, eBay-Contested MercExchange Patents Are on the Block, EcOMMERcEBY'rs
(May 30, 2003), http:llwww.ecommercebytes.com/cab/abn/y03/mO5/i30/sOl, quoted in Merc
Exchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
104. See MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 572.
105. Id. at 570.
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to establish a pattern of using its patents "as a sword to aid in litigation
or threatened litigation against infringers or potential infringers," this
aggressive brandishing of its patents demonstrated that MercExchange
was most concerned about money.10 6 The district court also noted that
because enhanced damages are similar to punitive damages in that they
seek to punish and deter egregious conduct, MercExchange may in fact
be overcompensated by monetary damages. 10 7 Accordingly, in this
instance the enhanced or punitive damages worked against
MercExchange receiving its requested injunctive relief.10 8 Although this
may be in accord with concerns about overcompensating, it is odd that
the fact the infringer is a willful one may work against reestablishing the
right to exclude.
Balancing of the hardships, the third factor, did not favor eBay or
MercExchange. 0 9 The court first found that because eBay was deter-
mined to be a willful infringer, it eased the court's "conscience" that
issuing an injunction against eBay using the patented technology might
substantially harm eBay's business. ° The court also noted that eBay
claimed publicly that it had designed around the patent; leading it to a
similar conclusion that eBay's business would not be ruined because of
an injunction."' In regard to MercExchange, the court noted that there
was great uncertainty as to the validity of the patent at issue and that
MercExchange existed entirely on licensing fees.' 1 2 Therefore, forcing
MercExchange to engage in one more licensing arrangement should not
cause it great hardship." 3
The last factor in this four-factor test concerns the public interest in
106. Id. at 582 ("Although the court recognizes that MercExchange has every right to utilize its
patents in such manner, such behavior suggests that an injunction against eBay may also be used
to obtain similar ends. Utilization of a ruling in equity as a bargaining chip suggests both that such
party never deserved a ruling in equity and that money is all that such party truly seeks .... ").
The court noted up front that the first and second factor are largely the same inquiry, but that to
adhere to the Supreme Court's four-factor test, it would analyze each separately. Id. at 569. n. 11.
107. Id. at 583.
108. See id. An idea worth pursuing in a subsequent article is that if a court is concerned about
overcompensation and therefore not willing to grant injunctive relief in addition to the
compensatory and enhanced damages, the court can allow the patentee to choose either injunctive
relief or the enhanced damages. Cf Paul J. Heald, Permanent Injunctions as Punitive Damages in
Patent Infringement Cases (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paepr No. 10-
38, 2011), available at http://ssrn.comL/abstract=1851681 (arguing that injunctions in patent cases
may be akin to punitive damages).
109. MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 583, 585-86.
110. Id. at 583-84.
111. Id. at 584.
112. Id. ("MercExchange's specialization in obtaining fees through threatened litigation
suggests that it will not suffer a hardship from a similar resolution of the instant matter.").
113. Id. at 584-85.
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the issuance of an injunction.114 Although this factor most often favors
the patent holder because the public has an interest in maintaining the
integrity and strength of the patent system, the court found this was not
true in this case." 5 The district court focused on the parties and their
respective impact on the public in general.' 16 In regard to eBay, the
court stated that it "unquestionably has a substantial impact on the
United States' economy."'1 17 In comparison, MercExchange is a two-per-
son company that "appear[s] to specialize in litigation and obtaining roy-
alties for licenses based on the threat of litigation."'" 8 And although a
strong patent system is needed to protect a small patent holder that is
being overtaken and infringed upon by a multi-billion dollar company,
the court stated the best equity argument is when that small patent holder
is using his invention to benefit the public or using licensing to further
that technology.' '9 The court found that MercExchange was not that
type of small inventor; rather, MercExchange is a small company that
was brandishing its patents for the sole purpose of making money,
neither benefiting the public nor furthering the evolution of technol-
ogy. 2° So although eBay was a willful infringer in this case, the court
found that the public interest would still be better served by eBay contin-
uing unaffected in its business operations.' 2 ' This result was appealed
and, ultimately, the parties reached a settlement in which Ebay pur-
chased the MercExchange patents.'
22
C. Reduced Access to Remedies for Patent Holders
The decision detailed above was heavily impacted by the fact that
MercExchange was an NPE and eBay was a large company that was
already using the patented technology in its daily business. 23 Although
the court admonished eBay for willfully infringing the patented technol-
ogy, it decided to allow eBay to continue using the technology against
114. Id. at 586.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 586-90.
117. Id. at 587. eBay supports an online marketplace consisting of tens of millions of buyers




120. Id. at 587-88.
121. Id. at 590.
122. See Linda Rosencrance, EBay, MercExchange settle long feud over several patents,
COMPUTERWORLD (FEB. 28, 2008, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9065





MercExchange's wishes. 124 This district court opinion after the Supreme
Court decision served as the beginning of a now near-categorical rule
that NPEs do not receive injunctions. 125 This opinion by itself is not a
worrisome result. MercExchange was a company built on licensing prior
to the infringement and after the infringement it still was able to license
its technology.126 If money is the greatest priority, then under these par-
ticular facts and with this patentee there appears no need for concern. 2 7
However, the path that the district court paved here is one involving
an arduous and labor intensive process of attempting to evaluate the
companies at issue, the value of their respective uses of the patented
technology, and the value of the patented technology with respect to
each company. The difficulty of determining base damages (lost profits
or reasonable royalties) has already prompted the Federal Circuit to
remark that the valuation task is "a difficult judicial chore, seeming
often to involve more the talents of a conjurer than those of a judge." '128
Further, there is nothing in the Patent Act that demands a patentee
use its patented technology and, in fact, the opposite is true. After a
patentee discloses its technology to the world, it is free to go into hiding
and not allow anyone to make, sell, or use the technology for twenty
years.'2 9 It is allowed to do so because the public already reaps the bene-
fit due to the disclosure of the invention. Of course, MercExchange is
not a particularly sympathetic patentee. MercExchange was not simply
an inventor who wanted to use his technology in his company and let no
one else use it, or simply elect not to use it and yet still others from
using it. MercExchange was actively seeking licensing fees and attempt-
ing to gain leverage with eBay due to the costs already invested in
eBay's online business with the "Buy-It-Now" feature. 130 Although the
patents were weak, MercExchange was a holdup threat. Accordingly, the
outcome and analysis of the district court opinion has not caused much
unfavorable commentary.
Another concern is that eBay's rule is not limited to cases with
NPEs like MercExchange. Courts are now denying injunctive relief to
patentees using the technologies when the patentee is not in direct com-
124. Id. at 590-91.
125. See Shrestha, supra note 5, at 134-36.
126. See MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
127. See id.
128. Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988),
overruled on other grounds by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp.,
383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
129. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
130. See MercExchange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 581.
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petition with their respective infringer(s)."' For example, in z4 Technol-
ogies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., z4 was a software-based company owned
by David Colvin, who was also the inventor of the two patents at
issue.132 The company used this patented technology in its product acti-
vation software, designed to limit the unauthorized use of software.
133
The jury found that Microsoft's software products, Office and Windows,
infringed z4's patents and that Microsoft infringed willfully. 134 After
this finding of willful infringement, z4 sought a permanent injunction
from the court.1 35 The district court analyzed this request in light of the
Supreme Court's ruling in eBay and denied the request.
136
The first factor-irreparable harm-weighed against the plaintiff,
z4.13 7 z4 argued that Microsoft's infringement prevented it from know-
ing or being able to calculate the level of success it would have achieved
in the product activation software market absent the infringement.
1 38
The court did not find this argument persuasive because Microsoft and
z4 were not direct competitors. 139 Microsoft does not produce or sell
product activation software like z4; the patented technology is just one
part of Microsoft's programs.140 The court found this fact significant
because in theory Microsoft was not preventing or disrupting z4's ability
to market, sell, or license its patented software.' 4' Accordingly, the court
held that because z4 did not prove that it would lose any future brand
name recognition, market share, or profits, it did not show that its inju-
ries were irreparable. 142
The second factor-adequacy of remedies available at law-like-
wise did not favor permanent injunctive relief.'43 z4 argued that losing
the right to exclude could never be adequately compensated by monetary
damages. 14 The district court cited eBay in stating "that the right to
exclude alone is not sufficient to support a finding of injunctive relief";
however, it went on to explain when that loss of a right is accompanied
with another intangible loss, such as market position, this "can present a
131. See, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440, 444 (E.D. Tex.
2006), affd, 507 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
132. See z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft, Corp., 507 F.3d 1340, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
133. z4 Techs., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 438.
134. Id. at 438-39.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 439, 444.
137. Id. at 441.




142. Id. at 440-41.
143. Id. at 441-42.
144. Id. at 441.
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situation where monetary damages cannot adequately compensate the
patent holder for that injury." '145 Because the court here did not find that
z4 suffered a loss of goodwill, market place, or brand recognition, and
that this patented technology was a very small portion of the technology
that Microsoft used in its programs, a reasonable royalty would fairly
compensate z4.146 Further, the district court found Microsoft's statement
convincing that in the next version of its software (to be released shortly
after the issuance of the court's opinion), it would no longer be infring-
ing z4's patented methods. 147 This signaled to the court that compensat-
ing for future royalties would not be as difficult as in some other
situations where there were many years left of patent enforcement and
no plan by the defendant to design around the patent. 48
The third factor-the balance of hardships-weighed against
injunctive relief due to Microsoft's convincing arguments that it would
be costly to redesign its current products and halt the infringing of
software that was already being used by Microsoft's consumers.149 For
example, Microsoft stated that it would need "to re-release its current
versions of Office, with 450 separate variations in thirty-seven different
languages, and Windows, with 600 separate variations in over forty lan-
guages." 5 Further, both Office and Windows "would have to be re-
engineered, tested, repackaged, and then placed into the appropriate dis-
tribution channels."'' This potential design around cost, especially in
light of the upcoming non-infringing product to be released shortly, was
too much when compared to z4's hardship of only receiving monetary
damages.' 52
The last factor-the public interest-again weighed in Microsoft's
favor and against the granting of injunctive relief.1 53 The court noted the
wide, pervasive use of Microsoft Windows and Office, and that although
the picture that Microsoft painted of massive havoc across the world
may not be true, the court stated that the public would suffer "some
145. Id. (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. 547 U.S. 388, 392 (2006)).
146. Id. (noting that eBay instructs courts to be weary of the situation where a "patented
invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to produce" and that
monetary damages in that situation are sufficient and that the public interest would not be served
by an injunction (quoting eBay, 547 U.S. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
147. See id. at 442.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 442-43.
150. Id. at 442.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 442-43 (finding that "Microsoft's use of z4's intellectual property is not to the
exclusion of z4 in any major sense and, to the extent it is, can be remedied in the form of
monetary damages").
153. Id. at 443-44.
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negative consequences" if it were to issue an injunction. 154 The court
then denied z4 its requested injunction.
55
The court was strongly swayed by the size and influence of the
parties involved in the litigation. Unlike the remand court of eBay, this
court gave little attention to the fact that Microsoft was a willful
infringer or that z4 was a practicing entity. The z4 court instead focused
on the pervasive use of Microsoft's products; and perhaps at a surface
level this is warranted. If Microsoft was going to lose millions and mil-
lions of dollars, we might worry about what is called "economic waste"
in other areas of law. For example, in contract law, a diminution of value
rule will sometimes replace the normal cost of repair rule when there is a
vastly disproportionate difference between the two. 156 The court might
also have worried that if it granted an injunction to z4, the injunction
would put z4 in a position of holdup with Microsoft. All these concerns
are valid in patent law, yet they were not of particular relevance or real
concern in this case. Microsoft was on the record that it had another non-
infringing version of Office and Word that was coming out shortly.'
57
As will be discussed below, there are easy tools at the court's disposal to
use in this type of situation.
Instead of staying the injunction until the new version is out, for
example, the end result here creates bad precedential law. Microsoft is
precisely the type of company that can afford to either license the pat-
ented technology or design around the patent technology to create its
own noninfringing technology that furthers innovation. Patent law is
supposed to encourage innovation by companies of such size and with as
much money as Microsoft, not allow these companies to circumvent
established property rules. z4 is not an NPE like MercExchange. It is the
small patentee that the eBay District Court mentioned that needs protec-
tion from a strong patent system. Not many companies can compete with
Microsoft's market power and influence in its industry. If this is a major
factor in balancing the reasonableness and utilities of patent use, small
inventors and companies will lose every time.
Another case, again involving Microsoft, will help further explain
why this precedent of not granting injunctions is troubling.'58 In i4i Ltd.
v. Microsoft, the evidence showed that Microsoft made statements that it
wanted to make the patentee's product "obsolete," and that it would
ensure that "there won't be a need for [the patentee's] product." 5 9
154. Id.
155. Id. at 444.
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 348(2) (1981).
157. See z4 Techs., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 442.
158. i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
159. Id. at 860. i4i is the owner of a patent relating to editing custom XML, and sells software
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Although the court did provide the small, practicing entity with a "nar-
row" injunction, Microsoft's size and widespread use played a bigger
role than did its willful infringement or its ability to have a new product
out in five months from the original order (thereby giving Microsoft
more months by the time the final ruling on the injunction was
affirmed). 6 °
My point here is not to argue that Microsoft is a bad actor or that
industry giants are preying on smaller inventors and companies. Rather,
my point is that we must have a strong patent system that provides
incentives for companies, no matter the size, to play by the rules.
Although in many cases courts appear to be concerned about parties cir-
cumventing the rules and displaying conduct that is unacceptable under
the patent laws,16 ' it also appears that courts are increasingly engaging
in an analysis of which party would best use the technology.' 62 Certainly
we should be concerned about stalling innovation because of holdup
conduct and about a company such as z4 that uses just one patented
component within Microsoft's multi-component technology, yet parties
such as z4 and i4i are not the type of patentee that threatens to "derail a
major enterprise."' 163 Further, no court has yet allowed this massive
that practices this technology. Id. at 839. Notably, this company is not a patent troll like
MercExchange. It actively expends resources to further its technology and uses its patented
technology in its business as a software consulting company. Id. Versions of Microsoft Word
since 2003 have had XML editing ability, and in 2007 i4i filed suit against Microsoft arguing that
the XML editor in certain versions of Word infringed its patented technology. Id. at 840. The jury
agreed with i4i, awarding it $200 million in damages, and further finding that Microsoft was a
willful infringer. Id.
160. Id. at 864. The district court did not treble the damages as allowed to by statute, but
instead granted i4i an extra $40 million based on Microsoft's willful infringement. Id. at 841, 858.
It also granted i4i a "narrow" injunction. Id. at 861. The Federal Circuit affirmed the damages,
only changing the effective date of the injunction. Id. at 864. Microsoft presented evidence that it
would likely need five months to be able to comply with the injunction, and so the district court's
limiting of the injunction's effective date to 60 days was an abuse of its discretion. Id. The Federal
Circuit affirmed the injunction, but set the new effective date as January 11, 2010. Id. This
allowance of extra time demonstrates how narrow the injunction that was placed on Microsoft is,
even though it seemed the court wanted to send the signal that willful infringers will be punished
and should not be able to continue to use the patented technology against the patentee's wishes.
161. Courts appear to be concerned about the conduct of infringers in describing their actions.
See, e.g., Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GmbH, 408 F.3d 1374, 1377
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that willful conduct is evinced by "egregious conduct"); IVAC Corp. v.
Terumo Corp., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1637, 1639 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (finding the infringer demonstrated a
"complete disregard of... patents," "total absence of any evidence of good faith at the time the
infringement commenced," and "no evidence of any effort to seek and follow the advice of
competent patent counsel or to alter the infringing design despite ... knowledge of [the asserted]
patent rights").
162. See, e.g., z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 443-44 (E.D. Tex.
2006) (discussing the positive effects that Microsoft products have on society), affid, 507 F.3d
1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
163. See Epstein, Disintegration, supra note 17, at 490.
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derailing to occur.t6' Patent damages are meant to put patent holders in
the position they enjoyed prior to infringement, not in a better posi-
tion.1 65 Courts (imperfectly at times) are aware of this distinction. If the
practicing entity wants to reestablish its right to exclude, that should be
granted. This fact may be taken into account when assessing what
enhanced damages to grant. Unfortunately, courts are not making this
distinction between the types of patentees and so access to equitable
relief may be limited for all patent holders.
The eBay opinion has played a large role in the ongoing debate in
patent law regarding how the patent system operates and how it should
operate. In particular, eBay has created a heightened focus on the behav-
ior of NPEs and the problem of patent holdup, as well as what rule-
based system intellectual property should employ. 66 This increased
focus on NPEs and holdup problems has prompted scholars to advocate
that patent law should shift toward a liability rule-based system.
167
III. EXISTING FRAMEWORKS
For many years now patent scholars have been debating how to
best change the way that patent damages are calculated. 68 Congres-
sional patent damage reform has also been seeking to alter the technical
rules of patent law.' 69 Yet these debates about how to change the way
patent remedies are determined are just the surface level debates; there is
a deeper one in patent law that has only recently surfaced. 171 In short,
many scholars and reformers feel that the patent itself has grown too
large and too powerful.1 7 1 With high dollar damage awards continuing
to attract public attention, coupled with the potential for aggressive
164. See id. ("The nightmare example is the holder of a single small patent who wants to shut
down the latest Microsoft word-processing program. The fear here is that the price demanded to
waive injunctive relief far exceeds the value that the patentee could have obtained if it had
licensed the product to the defendant before the defendant developed its new product. This
consideration carries a good deal of weight, at least in these extreme cases. Yet it is instructive
that there is no decided case in the Federal Circuit that granted an injunction under such extreme
conditions, eBay included.").
165. See NARD, supra note 25, at 204.
166. See, e.g., James M. Fischer, What Hath eBay v. MercExchange Wrought?, 14 LEwis &
CLARK L. REV. 555, 556-58 (2010).
167. See id. at 561; Opderbeck, supra note 36, at 131.
168. See, e.g., Opderbeck, supra note 36, at 131.
169. Id. See also Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 4 (2008); Patent Reform
Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th
Cong. § 5 (2007).
170. See Opderbeck, supra note 36, at 131 ("At a deeper level, arguments about changing the
shape of patent damages calculations are arguments about changing the shape of patent law
itself.").
171. See Golden, supra note 5, at 2112 ("Academics, policymakers, and even sitting judges
have suggested that patent law may have overleaped its proper bounds, or at least become too
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NPEs and harmful holdups, many commentators have been advocating
for a shift toward a patent system based on a liability rule. 172 There is no
doubt that this has started to occur because of eBay, yet this rule change
in patent law-a shift away from a strong property rights system-
should be analyzed from multiple angles.
Patent scholars, courts, and reformers must decide whether the cur-
rent direction of patent law should be continued, or whether another road
should be selected. This Article takes one step in that direction by ana-
lyzing how established property systems have historically struggled with
concerns such as holdout and balancing the most efficient use of prop-
erty. As Richard Epstein recently explained, there are "huge returns
[that] lie from systematizing intellectual property by analogy and exten-
sion to successful legal regimes elsewhere."' t7 3 The legal regime that is
most applicable to intellectual property is the one it is already within-
property. 174 That said, we must learn from and apply these analogies
with caution, as there are also significant differences between real prop-
erty and patents.
175
Within the framework of property, there are two subspecies that
highlight the differences and objectives of property rules from liability
rules. The first is nuisance law (imperfect liability rule) and the second
is the law regarding trespass to land (property rule). I do not argue here
that patent law should be structured precisely like nuisance or trespass,
but rather that we can learn from both systems and provide tools for
courts to use that are familiar and have been proven effective. The fol-
lowing subsections will establish the general framework of property
rules and liability rules, and then further that framework by discussing
the different systems of nuisance and trespass. "By [understanding and]
following rules of proven worth in other areas, each new articulation of
likely to frustrate, rather than to fulfill, its constitutional purpose of 'promot[ing] the Progress of
Science and useful Arts."' (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
172. See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Intellectual Liability, 88 TEX. L. REV. 253, 253, 256 (2009);
Ben Depoorter, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Patent Market Failure, 4 ERASMUS L. REV.
59, 59 (2008); Mark A. Lemley & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern
Information?, 85 TEX. L. REV. 783, 793-96 (2007) (identifying pitfalls of property rules and
exploring the potential of liability rules).
173. Epstein, Disintegration, supra note 17, at 458.
174. Id. at 461 ("The basic principles of property law are alive and well, and they are capable
of reasonable extension to all forms of intellectual property."); cf. Lemley, Free Riding, supra
note 17, at 1031-32 ("The absolute protection or full-value view draws significant intellectual
support from the idea that intellectual property is simply a species of real property rather than a
unique form of legal protection designed to deal with public goods problems."); Robert P. Merges,
Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2661 (1994)
[hereinafter Merges, Of Property Rules]. ("[T]he overall goal of intellectual property law is often
described in allocational efficiency terms (i.e., to increase economic output by overcoming market
failures associated with the public goods quality of creative works) ... .
175. See generally Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 17.
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property rights need not be a voyage into the unknown." 176
A. Property and Liability Rules
In their foundational article on legal entitlements, Guido Calabresi
and A. Douglas Melamed set forth a framework for defining and under-
standing various types of remedies that protect entitlements. 177 They dis-
tinguish property and liability rules and identify the remedies that
enforce these rules in subject areas such as tort, property, and criminal
law. 178 In their article, Calabresi and Melamed explain that some reme-
dies are set at such a high price that deters the taking of an entitlement
without obtaining consent from the owner (the one who decides the
value of the entitlement). 179 These remedies are protected by property
rules, which are enforced through the use of injunctions and punitive
damages. 180 Although "property rules abound in the law" and a tradi-
tional preference evidenced by courts still exists, scholars have for many
years advocated for more use of liability rules in the law.181 Patent law
scholars have contributed to this trending debate. 182 In contrast to a
property rule, a liability rule allows for a nonconsensual taking of an
entitlement in exchange for a payment of money damages. 83  The
amount of money to be paid to the entitlement holder is determined by
non-market "prices" that are most often officially set by a court in the
form of monetary damages. 18' Epstein has explained a key economic
difference between property and liability rules:
Because property rules give one person the sole and absolute power
176. Epstein, Disintegration, supra note 17, at 458 ("Instead, it can avoid the pitfalls for new
forms of property rights by incorporating the salient features of established regimes. That
incorporation cannot be slavish, however, because the information that lies at the core of
intellectual property exhibits characteristics that are not shared by physical assets.").
177. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9. "In the context of Coasean bargaining,
the term 'entitlement' can mean anything from the right to pollute to the right to exclude entry to
one's real property." Rinehart, supra note 9, at 504 n. 114 (citation omitted).
178. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1089-93. The Calabresi-Melamed framework
explains four remedial choices (set in a 2x2 matrix) for the allocation and protection of property.
See id. at 1115-16. These four individual rules, two property and two liability, will not be
specifically discussed in this article as they are not important to the thesis of this paper.
179. Id. at 1092 ("An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone
who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary
transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller.").
180. See Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1723.
181. Id. at 1732 ("The arguments for liability rules challenge a long tradition of preference for
property rules in the law and a line of traditional commentary that still resonates today.").
182. See id. ("The arguments for liability rules challenge a long tradition of preference for
property rules in the law and a line of traditional commentary that still resonates today."); Id. at
1723 ("The new wisdom in favor of liability rules also runs counter to strong tendencies in the
law.")




over the use and disposition of a given thing, it follows that its owner
may hold out for as much as he pleases before selling the thing in
question. In contrast, by limiting the owner's protection to a liability
rule, that holdout power is lost, and in its stead the owner of the thing
receives some right to compensation for the thing that has been taken
away from him against his will.'
8 5
Many scholars have applied these rules to intellectual property
law.'86 In patent terms, a court enforces a property rule remedy when it
awards the patentee with an injunction against the defendant's continued
infringement, as well as when the patentee's damages are enhanced
based on the conduct (the willful infringement) of the defendant. A court
enforces a liability rule when it denies injunctive relief and sets a licens-
ing rate itself (or demands that the parties do so) for the defendant's
continued use of the patented technology. Scholars are divided on how
patents are best protected. Some scholars argue that patents are property
and should be protected by a property rule in order to commercialize
innovations and provide incentives for negotiation with the threat of an
injunction,' 87 and other scholars argue that a liability rule may be best in
patent law because of high transaction costs and the potential for
holdup. 188
B. Frameworks Protected By Different Rules
Henry Smith extended the property rule and liability rule literature
by refraining this conversation as one of an "exclusion strategy" or
"governance strategy." 189 The exclusion strategy, most heavily apparent
185. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules,
106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2091 (1997) [hereinafter Epstein, A Clear View].
186. See, e.g., Blair & Cotter, supra note 45, at 821; Lemley & Weiser, supra note 172, at
793-97; Merges, Of Property Rules, supra note 174, at 2664-67; Rinehart, supra note 9, at
503-09.
187. See, e.g., F. Scott Kieff, IP Transactions: On the Theory & Practice of Commercializing
Innovation, 42 Hous. L. REV. 727, 735-743 (2005) [hereinafter Kieff, IP Transactions] ("In
contrast to the reward theories of patents, the commercialization theory sees patents as enforced
by a property rule to help facilitate commercialization of the invention, after it has been made.")
(citation omitted). See also id. at 735 ("Providing a focal point, or beacon, the publicly recorded
IP right helps each of these individuals find each other, and then by cracking the Arrow
Information Paradox otherwise facing them, facilitates negotiations among them.") (citations
omitted); Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 12, at 1303-06 (arguing that
property rules are preferred over liability rules when private bargaining is to take place in the IP
context). But see Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 179
(1999) (arguing that imprecise or "muddy" rules are favorable in online entitlements as a means of
inducing private-ordered solutions).
188. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 2044 (arguing in favor of a reasonable
royalty for patent damages to avoid patent holdup).
189. See Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 12, at 975-90; Henry E. Smith,
Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742,
1745-46 (2007) [hereinafter Smith, Intellectual Property as Property]; Smith, Property and
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in property law with trespass to land as the quintessential example, best
protects property holders' interests by sending a signal to potential tres-
passers.' 90 The signal is the boundary line that is established when one
becomes an unauthorized trespasser-the sign that says "keep out."'19'
The property owner's right to exclude is enforced through the threat of
injunctive relief and punitive damages. 92 The exclusionary strategy is
best implemented by property rules.' 93 This strategy is based on the idea
that the right to exclude is valuable because of an interest in use, and the
invasion of space is a (very) rough "proxy" for harmful use.1 94
The governance strategy, with nuisance law as an example, allows
a person the right to engage in a particular behavior.' 95 The delineation
effort is focused on the person's action, such as emitting odors into a
neighborhood.' 96 Accordingly, the governance strategy is much more
concerned with proper use of an entitlement, where "something close to
a use-by-use basis" of analysis occurs. 197 Although nuisance law is not
as pure of an example of the governance strategy that is often protected
by liability rules as trespass is of the exclusion strategy, many scholars
have focused on the increasing trend away from injunctive relief in nui-
sance law and more toward. monetary relief and adjudication based on
analyzing the competing uses of the property.1 98 Trespass to land, imple-
Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1755-57. Smith finds that the close relationship between
property and intellectual property is because of "the role that information costs play in the
delineation and enforcement of rights." Smith, Intellectual Property as Property, supra note 189,
at 1745. I will not be delving into even a mere fraction of Smith's literature here, as it is heavily
based on economic theory and therefore outside the scope of this article, but suffice it to say that
there is much here that is of great interest.
190. See Smith, Intellectual Property as Property, supra note 189, at 1745.
191. Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1728 ("Property gives the right to
exclude from a 'thing,' good against everyone else. On the dutyholder side, the message is a
simple one-to 'keep out."').
192. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 12, at 973 ("Because such an exclusion
regime builds on simple on/off signals such as boundary crossings, rights to exclude are typically
protected with injunctions and supracompensatory damages. Exclusion is associated
with . . . 'property rules,' under which a remedy is strong enough to deter nonconsensual
takings ....").
193. Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1728 ("[A]rgu[ing] that property
rules have an advantage in implementing the exclusion strategy so that, where an exclusion
strategy is called for, property rules will generally be superior to liability rules.").
194. See id.
195. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 12, at 973.
196. Id.
197. Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1728 (explaining that "rights are
delineated using signals (sometimes called 'proxy variables' or 'proxies' in the economic
literature) that pick out and protect individual uses and user behavior").
198. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 12, at 984 (recognizing that in nuisance
law "the balancing of utilities approach . . . has been gaining favor, especially among
commentators"). See also id. at 980 ("Liability rules tend to be associated with governance rules
.... .).
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mented by the exclusion strategy, and nuisance law, increasingly being
implemented by a governance strategy, are both fields that embody at
different levels the right to exclude and the competing interests of the
property owner, the infringer/violator, and the public. These subspecies
of property are instructive for the direction that patent law has come
from and is currently headed.
1. NUISANCE
Famously described as an "impenetrable jungle,"' 99 the many paths
of nuisance law have largely been cleared and proven reasonably coher-
ent.2" The law of nuisance focuses on the use and enjoyment of one's
land and generally involves indirect intrusions such as odor, noise,
smoke, and vibrations by an adjacent landowner.2°" There have been
several variations of nuisance standards employed over the years by
courts and discussed by scholars. The two polar ends of the spectrum
consist of an older, more rigid view of nuisance and a modern, balancing
approach of nuisance.202 On the left is the more bright-line view of nui-
sance that looks very similar to trespass.20 3 This approach focuses on the
indirect invasion of the owner's space and often ends in injunctive relief
for the aggrieved property owner.2 On the right of the spectrum is the
modem approach, which focuses on the harms and benefits of the defen-
dant's conduct and attempts to remedy the harm through monetary dam-
ages.205 This flexible approach has allowed previous trespassing actions
to fall under the doctrine of nuisance when there is a public good at
stake.20 6 Under this modern approach, a court is tasked with analyzing
and weighing the use announced by the owner against the conflicting
use announced by the (most often) adjacent owner.2 07 In this Article, the
adjacent owner is the taker; in the classic nuisance case the taker is the
polluter.2 0 8
Under all of the variations on the spectrum, the complaining prop-
erty owner must demonstrate both a substantial and unreasonable non-
199. See W. PAGE KEETON et al., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 86, at 616 (W.
Paige Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS].
200. DOBBS, supra note 27, at 1320-1321 (arguing that this "jungle" is not that impenetrable).
201. See id. at 1322 (citing various examples).
202. See Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 12, at 992, 996-97.
203. See id. at 990-92.
204. See id.at 992.
205. See id.
206. An example is in the case of overflights. See supra notes 222-33 and accompanying text.
207. See Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 12, at 985, 992.
208. See id. at 985 ("Under governance rules, a court has to weigh the value of various uses,
the ones announced by the owner and the conflicting one of the taker-the polluter in the classic
nuisance example.").
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trespassory invasion of the right to use and enjoy her land.209 This
means that not just any annoyance caused by a nearby taker will consti-
tute an actionable nuisance. It must be a substantial and unreasonable
invasion of a property owner's use and enjoyment of her land. 210 This
"reasonableness" inquiry is defined not by the negligence of the reasona-
ble person, but by the reasonable use of one's property in light of the
surrounding circumstances.2 '
For example, in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., eight owners of
property, located near the new and large cement facility of Atlantic
Cement Co., sued seeking injunctive relief and damages against the
cement company.212 The trial court found that the Atlantic Cement Co.,
in its operation of this new plant, created a legally recognizable nuisance
due to the "large quantities of dust" and "excessive vibration from blast-
ing" that substantially and unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs'
use and enjoyment of their property. 2 3 Finding that a permanent injunc-
tion would do comparatively little good for the plaintiffs and would cre-
ate great public hardship, the trial court denied injunctive relief, issuing
only monetary damages based on the loss of the value of the land.214 In
209. Id. at 992 n.83 ("[N]uisance is a substantial nontrespassory invasion of use and enjoyment
of land that is caused either by intentional and unreasonable activities, or negligent, reckless, or
ultrahazardous activities." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821F, 822 (1979))).
210. This is different from the law of trespass where even those that can show no damage to
the land may still recover nominal damages and in the rare case punitive damages. See Jacque v.
Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 159 (Wis. 1997) (recognizing " that in certain situations
of trespass, the actual harm is not in the damage done to the land, which may be minimal, but in
the loss of the individual's right to exclude others from his or her property"); Smith, Exclusion
and Property Rules, supra note 12, at 995 (stating that "there is no de minimis exception in
trespass" like there is in nuisance law).
211. See DOBBS, supra note 27, at 1326 (explaining that reasonableness in nuisance law is not
defined as it is in negligence law, which refers to risk-creating behavior, but rather reasonableness
in nuisance law refers to the expectations of a property owner occupying the plaintiffs land).
212. Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 287 N.Y.S.2d 112, 113-115 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967), affd, 294
N.Y.S.2d 452 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968), rev'd, 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). The Atlantic Cement
Company spent "more than $40,000,000 in the erection of one of the largest and most modem
cement plants in the world." Id. at 113. For a thorough analysis of Boomer and its effects on
nuisance law, see generally Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past,
Present, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189 (1990).
213. Boomer, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
214. Id. The following "public" factors were listed: "The defendant's immense investment in
the Hudson River Valley, its contribution to the Capital District's economy and its immediate help
to the education of children in the Town of Coeymans through the payment of substantial sums in
school and property taxes." Id. Further, the court found that "[t]he company installed at great
expense the most efficient devices available to prevent the discharge of dust and polluted air into
the atmosphere." Id. at 113. The appellate court affirmed the trial court rulings on injunctive relief
and monetary damages. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 294 N.Y.S.2d 452, 453-54 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1968), rev'd, 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970). The New York Court of Appeals held that
an injunction should be granted temporarily and vacated once the cement company paid the
plaintiffs permanent damages. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y.
1970).
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doing so, the court protected the plaintiffs' right to the use and enjoy-
ment of their property by using a liability rule. Consequently, the plain-
tiffs were not able to force the Atlantic Cement Co. to stop indirectly
invading their property through vibrations and dust. It is this type of
factual situation regarding a dispute over a legal entitlement that a liabil-
ity rule is invoked. In the end, the plaintiffs were monetarily compen-
sated and both property owners were able to continue in their daily lives
and activities.
The law of nuisance is also used at times to reach a balanced and
flexible remedy when a direct trespass (instead of indirect as in Boomer)
involves the public at large, or a significant monetary investment. These
former trespasses are (re)classified as nuisances.' 15 An example of this
is plane overflights.2" 6 Under an older view of trespass and nuisance, a
high-altitude overflight would be classified as a trespass.217 The plane
physically invades the ad coelum principle that property ownership
includes space above the real property; therefore, the overflight would
ordinarily be classified as a trespass.2 18 Under a property-rule regime,
the property owner should be able to receive injunctive relief as well as
nominal damages and punitive damages if applicable. However, courts
were hesitant to apply this rule due to the potential of high transaction
costs and opportunities for holdout.2 19 Instead, courts have applied the
law of nuisance to this area of law.
An example of this is Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc., where residents
from a neighborhood just north of a small airport sued under a theory of
trespass. 220 Although the planes were invading the plaintiffs' space
above their homes, the plaintiffs' actual complaint was about the noise
level and vibrations from the flights taking off and landing. 221 The plain-
tiffs also were concerned about the risk and fear of planes crashing into
their homes.222 The defendant argued the "coming to the nuisance" the-
ory because it had operated the small airport, servicing mainly single-
engine, non-commercial planes, for many years prior to the building of
215. See DOBBS, supra note 27, at 1320-22.
216. See id. at 1320.
217. Id.
218. See Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 12, at 1026.
219. Id. ("When high-altitude overflights conflicted with strict application of the ad coelum
principle that ownership extended indefinitely upward from a parcel of land, courts were ready to
define the property rights away from the owner in the face of the enormous transaction costs (and
perhaps holdout potential) facing airlines if they had to negotiate with all those owning land lying
under the flight path of their airplanes.").
220. Atkinson v. Bernard, Inc., 355 P.2d 229, 230, 232 (Or. 1960).
221. See id. at 230.
222. See id.
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the neighborhood. 23
The Oregon Supreme Court noted that while Oregon courts had not
directly answered the question of whether the "ancient and formal doc-
trine of trespass or the more flexible concept of nuisance" should apply,
anytime a discussion of "reasonableness" is commenced the court is nec-
essarily "tak[ing] leave of trespass and steer[ing] into the discretionary
byways of nuisance. 224 Accordingly, the court looked at the competing
interests-protecting the exclusionary rights of the property owners and
the public interest in protecting the freedom of air travel-as well as the
level of the noise and vibration as a result of the overflights of the
planes.225 The court held that the proper cause of action here was nui-
sance, but that ultimately acoustical studies needed to be performed to
determine if the noise was unreasonable.226 Finally, the Oregon Supreme
Court instructed the trial court to be careful to narrowly enjoin the air-
port, if at all, due to the highly valued public benefit of flight.
227
This shift in nuisance law toward a liability rule regime has also
moved nuisance law away from the enforcement mechanism of punitive
damages. When punitive damages are granted in nuisance law (normally
also accompanied by an adjudication of trespass), the tort was commit-
ted with a certain level of intent to harm another.228 This is in line with
the original understanding of property and liability rules. A liability rule
allows the interested taker the option to take or use the entitlement it
wants and to later pay officially determined damages.2 29 These damages
"are designed to mimic a hypothetical market price, but they may be
pegged at average harm or some other nonpunitive level. 23°
223. See id. at 230, 232.
224. Id. at 232. The court further noted William Harvey's observation that "some decisions
range freely over both the trespass and the nuisance rationales-the airspace zone in which
intrusion by aircraft would be a nuisance apparently being considered in certain opinions as
coterminous with that in which it would constitute a trespass ... while others which rely upon
nuisance as the ground of decision might easily be interpreted in trespass terms." Id. (quoting
William B. Harvey, Landowners' Rights in the Air Age: The Airport Dilemma, 56 MICH. L. REv.
1313, 1315 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
225. See id. at 232-34.
226. Id.at 233-34.
227. See id. at 234.
228. Smith explains that "[i]ntentional torts are another matter; the suspicion here is that there
is more going on than a missed transaction." Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 10,
at 1733. "In the liability rule literature it is common to identify punitive damages as implementing
a property rule, because punitive damages aim at deterring rather than pricing nonconsensual
transfers." Id. at 1733 n. 40.
229. See id. at 1749.
230. Id. (explaining that property rules and liability rules are generally associated with
different remedies, with property rules representing a sanction and liability rules representing a
price).
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2. TRESPASS
Regarding real property, where we sometimes view "property own-
ership [as being] comprised of numerous 'sticks in a bundle of rights,"'
the right to exclude is arguably the most important stick.2 31 We can also
view property ownership as simply giving an owner the right to exclude
from a "thing. 232 Either way, if this right to exclude is violated and an
infringer enters the property of another, the property owner has a cause
of action against the infringer sounding in tort: trespass.233 Trespass is a
(relatively) straightforward cause of action. Simply, one may not enter
land belonging to someone else without permission from the landowner.
And like infringement in patent law, the tort of trespass is a strict liabil-
ity tort.234 No specific intent to cause wrongful harm or loss is
needed.235 Rather, there has to be an intention to enter the property,
236
and the property owner needs to show rightful ownership or possession
231. Georgette Chapman Phillips, Boundaries of Exclusion, 72 Mo. L. REv. 1287, 1289-90
(2007). But see id. at 1289 n.4 (citing Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 745-47 (1917)) (explaining that
the theory of nominalism values all the sticks equally).
232. Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1728 ("Property gives the right to
exclude from a 'thing,' good against everyone else.").
233. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1823, 1823-24 (2009) ("Ex ante, the owner's right to exclude others from her property
receives the highest degree of protection.... Ex post, however, things change dramatically. After
a trespass ends, the typical remedy an aggrieved owner can receive in court is compensation
measured by the market value of the unauthorized use. Courts ordinarily set the compensation
amount equal to the rent that owners of similar properties can obtain on the market. This measure
applies to all trespass cases except the most egregious ones, where courts are authorized to grant
punitive damages. Ex post, therefore, the owner must suffice herself with lesser protection than
she originally had, namely, market-value compensation. Under current law, the trespasser
effectively holds a call option on the owner's property.").
234. See Thomas v. City of Kan. City, 92 S.W.3d 92, 97-98 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) ("'Trespass
has its origin in an intentional act, even though the actor may not intend to invade the property of
another.'") (quoting Looney v. Hindman, 649 S.W.2d 207, 212 (Mo. 1983)); see also Peasley
Transfer & Storage Co. v. Smith, 979 P.2d 605, 616 (Idaho 1999) (stating that "where there has
been a positive act of dominion over another's property, unauthorized by the owner, it is not
necessary that the actor intend to commit a trespass or a conversion").
235. See Cleveland Park Club v. Perry, 165 A.2d 485, 487-88 (D.C. 1960) (noting that
"[w]here ... the cause of action is based on trespass the cases hold unequivocally that since
recovery under that theory is based on force and resultant damage," the intent to injure is
irrelevant); DoBBs, supra note 27, at 98 & n.l.
236. DOBBs, supra note 27, at 98 n.1 ("Although neither deliberation, purpose, motive, nor
malice are necessary elements of intent, the defendant must intend the act which in law constitutes
the invasion of the plaintiff's right." (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). This
act may be one of mistake or misunderstanding. See Golonka v. Plaza at Latham, LLC, 704
N.Y.S.2d 703, 706 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) ("[A] person entering upon the land of another without
permission, 'whether innocently or by mistake, is a trespasser.'" (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted)).
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of the property and an unauthorized entry2 37 or direct injury to her prop-
erty.238 Under the law of trespass, the property owner does not have to
show that the trespasser caused any significant damage; nominal dam-
ages may be awarded.239 If a trespasser enters in a particularly egregious
manner, punitive damages may be awarded as well to punish the
infringer and deter similar behavior in the future.2 40 Further, if the tres-
pass is likely to continue again an injunction may be entered by the court
to prohibit future trespasses.24'
The textbook case of a trespass with punitive damages attached is
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc.242 The Jacques sued Steenberg, a
mobile home company, for crossing over their land to deliver a mobile
home.24 3 Prior to this intentional trespass, Steenberg had asked for the
Jacques' permission and offered compensation to cut across their prop-
erty in order to save themselves time and money as well as avoid a steep
snow bank.24 4 The Jacques repeatedly told Steenberg that it may not cut
across their property, and the court noted that the Jacques were sensitive
about allowing others on their land because of a previous adverse pos-
session action that caused the loss of their property valued at over
$10,000.245
After an unofficial mediation where the Jacques again refused to
grant permission for Steenberg to traverse across their property, Steen-
berg delivered the mobile home in the most efficient and safest route-
trespassing on the Jacques' land in the process.2 4 6 Steenberg intention-
237. Phillips, supra note 230, at 1291 ("Possession and unauthorized entry form the prongs of
the prima facie proof of the tort.").
238. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 24 (1999) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TORTS] (stating that the
action for trespass covers unlawful entry as well as when "D uses force to 'directly' injure P's
property"); see also Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 12, at 992 ("The law of
trespass applies to gross physical invasions by visible objects, applies a test of strict liability, and
routinely allows for injunctions."). As stated above, an indirect injury, such as a foul odor, is not
actionable through trespass, but rather through the law of nuisance. See, e.g., Penland v. Redwood
Sanitary Sewer Serv. Dist., 956 P.2d 964, 966 (Or. 1998) (explaining that injury is inherent in a
tort claim).
239. See Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 12, at 995 ("Unlike in nuisance,
there is no de minimis exception in trespass. One reason for the lack of a de minimis exception in
trespass follows from its nature as an exclusion regime.").
240. See EPSTEIn, TORTS, supra note 238, at 23 ("Finding nominal damages could therefore
serve as the predicate for punitive damages, which are not normally available unless D has
committed some recognized tort.").
241. See id.
242. Jaque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
243. Id. at 156.
244. See id. at 157.
245. Id. See also Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 12, at 983 n.52 (explaining
that the Jaques' "belief was mistaken because permission negates the hostility required for adverse
possession or prescription").
246. Jaque, 563 N.W.2d at 157.
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ally trespassed, with the court noting that the frustrated foreman alleg-
edly used colorful language when directing his workers to cross the
Jacques' land.2 47 Ultimately, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld a
jury award of nominal compensatory damages in the amount of $1, and
a jury award of $100,000 in punitive damages. 248 This punitive award
seems quite extreme (and certainly the discrepancy between the amount
of nominal damages and punitive damages is extreme). There was no
harm done to the land, and it appears that the Jacques were holding out
for a somewhat irrational reason. 49 Yet "the court allowed punitive
damages in order to vindicate the right to exclude and noted that without
them, intentional violations of the right to exclude could not be
deterred. '25 0 The court here protected the Jacques' right to exclude with
a property rule.2  It did not inquire about the best use of the property or
the Jacques' reasonableness in refusing to grant permission.25 2 Simply,
the court honored the Jacques' right to be the "gatekeeper" of their
property.
2 5 3
Although the Jacques' were able to enforce what seemed like an
absolute right to exclude, this is not always the case. A longstanding
exception to a property owner's right to exclude is that of "necessity."2
'54
The doctrine of necessity dates back to at least the sixteenth century
255
and serves to legally excuse a guilty trespasser.2 56 The necessity privi-
lege is invoked by the trespasser who chooses the "lesser of two
evils"-the action that avoids the greatest harm.2 57 By choosing this
247. See id.
248. See id. at 158, 166.
249. The Jacques were concerned about adverse possession, which was not at issue here
because the claimant has to be in possession of the property without the owner's consent. See
Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 12, at 983 n.54 ("A claim of adverse possession
or prescription must be hostile; the claimant must possess or use the property without the owner's
permission.").
250. Id. at 983 (citing Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 158-62).
251. See id.
252. See id.at 983-84.
253. Id. at 984 (arguing "that this strong form of delegation of the 'gatekeeper' right to
owners-even in the face of facts like those of Jacque-makes sense on an information-cost
theory"). In this case if the Jacques could show that Steenberg Homes had another mobile home to
deliver and was apt to cross the same path, the court would also have likely issued a permanent
injunction against Steenberg. But see Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 233, at 1823-24 (arguing
that ex post property owners do not have the same strong rights, notably the right to exclude, that
they do ex ante).
254. See EPsTEIN, TORTS, supra note 238, at 59. See also WIL.LIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE
A.WHrtrMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 411 (3d ed. 2000) (explaining "others [may] enter with the
rightful possessor's permission but [also] in a few cases, against his will").
255. See Shaun P. Martin, The Radical Necessity Defense, 73 U. CrN. L. REV. 1527, 1532-33
(2005) (citations omitted).
256. See Phillips, supra note 230, at 1292-93.
257. John Alan Cohan, Private and Public Necessity and the Violation of Property Rights, 83
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lesser evil, thereby avoiding great harm, an act that would otherwise be
wrongful and punished by the law is in essence deemed legal.258 How-
ever, the harm being avoided must be in the form of a grave risk, such as
the risk of death, serious bodily injury, or a significant loss of prop-
erty.259 Significantly, the need for immediate and illegal action must not
arise out of the defendant's own action.26 °
There are two categories of necessity: private necessity and public
necessity. 261 The difference between private and public necessity is
whom the grave danger or imminent harm will affect. An example
where a public necessity privilege arises is when a defendant enters the
plaintiff's land and destroys the plaintiff's house to prevent the spread of
a fire that would have otherwise destroyed an entire city.2 62 Absent the
imminent harm to the city because of the spreading fire, the defendant
would be liable for intentionally trespassing on the plaintiffs land.
Jules Coleman has constructed an example of private necessity.
Hal, a diabetic loses his insulin in an accident and enters the unoccupied
home of another diabetic, Carla, and takes the insulin that he needs to
prevent his impending death.263 In doing so, he ensures that there is
enough insulin for Carla's own daily dose.264 In this example, Hal is
justified in trespassing on Carla's land and taking what he needed for his
own survival.2 65 Accordingly, he is not liable for trespass though he
most likely must pay for the insulin that he took.26 6 We would call this
necessity an incomplete privilege. It is not a complete privilege because
the defendant, Hal in the insulin case, must pay for the damage he
caused. He is, however, not liable legally for his trespassory conduct.
N.D. L. REV. 651, 654 (2007) (citing GLANVILLE WIIAts, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE
CRIMINAL LAW 198 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1957)). See also Martin, supra note 255, at 1527-28;
Phillips, supra note 230, at 1292-93.
258. Cohan, supra note 257, at 653-54 (citing WILLIAMS, supra note 257, at 198.
259. See EPSTEIN, TORTS, supra note 238, at 59.
260. Id. (stating that "[n]ecessity cases, pure and simple, never arise out of P's wrong").
261. See Phillips, supra note 230, at 1292.
262. DOBBS, supra note 27, at 251. This particular instance stems from an early example in
English history where the Lord Mayor of London refused to order or consent to forty houses or
their furniture being removed in order to save the city from the spreading fire. See Respublica v.
Sparhawk, 1 U.S. 357, 363 (1788) (recounting story). The reason given for the Lord's refusal to
order or consent to the destruction of property was that he feared he would be charged with
trespass, and, as a result of his fear, half of London was burned. Id.
263. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 282 (1992).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 282-83 (Coleman finds that Hal is justified both legally and morally); but see
George C. Christie, The Defense of Necessity Considered from the Legal and Moral Points of
View, 48 DuKE L.J. 975, 978 (1999) (arguing that there is little support in Coleman's view that
Hal has not violated Carla's rights but only infringed them and therefore has not committed a
wrong but only caused a wrongful loss that he must pay).
266. See COLEMAN, supra note 263, at 282-83.
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A well known case involving the defense of public necessity is Vin-
cent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. 267 Although the defense of neces-
sity is most easily justified when used to defend or save life, it may also
be used to save the significantly more valuable property.26 The defen-
dant's steamship, the Reynolds, was tied to the plaintiff's dock while
goods were being unloaded. 269 During the unloading process a storm
developed, ultimately producing winds of fifty miles per hour. 270 The
captain of the Reynolds decided to stay moored at the plaintiffs dock
rather than attempt to face the tumultuous sea.27 1 Throughout the course
of the storm, the crew replaced worn and frayed lines to ensure that the
steamship stayed at the dock.272 The result of the Reynolds being tossed
against the dock by the heavy rain and waves during the course of the
storm was five hundred dollars' worth of damage to the dock.273 The
court held that the defendants had not acted negligently in keeping the
steamship moored at the dock during the storm, and it instead found that
the captain and crew "exercised good judgment and prudent seaman-
ship."' 274 Nevertheless, the court held that the defendants were responsi-
ble for the damage, stating:
Theologians hold that a starving man may, without moral guilt,
take what is necessary to sustain life; but it could hardly be said that
the obligation would not be upon such person to pay the value of the
property so taken when he became able to do so. And so public
necessity, in times of war or peace, may require the taking of private
property for public purposes; but under our system of jurisprudence
compensation must be made.275
The dock owner's right to exclude is ordinarily protected by a prop-
erty rule, yet when such facts as these are present a court may elect to
not enforce a property rule. Instead, it may order that the dock owner's
right to exclude is supported only by a liability rule.276 During the time
of necessity, a ship in the position of the Reynolds is permitted to "take
now, and pay later. '277 However, as soon as the imminent risk of grave
danger passes-the storm in this case-the property owner's right to
267. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910).
268. Christie, supra note 265, at 981-82 (arguing that "Vincent cannot support most of the
broad conclusions that have been drawn from it").





274. Id. at 221.
275. Id. at 222.
276. See Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1735.
277. See id.
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exclude is again protected by a property rule, and a trespasser will be
subject to an injunction and punitive damages if applicable.
27 8
The mechanism of switching from a property rule to a liability rule
in time of grave danger is useful in the patent context. I propose under
my trespass-as-infringement framework that the role of an incomplete
privilege, one akin to that of necessity, should be utilized in situations of
public harm resulting from the public's loss of access to technology or to
prevent significant economic waste like in Vincent v. Lake Erie. The use
of an incomplete privilege will prevent the problem of holdup being a
constant threat to the patent industry and yet also allow patentees consis-
tent access to injunctive relief.
IV. REFRAMING PATENT REMEDIES
The rule change in eBay v. MercExchange and subsequent case law
has changed the structure of patent remedies. An NPE and practicing
patent holder that is in indirect competition with its infringer no longer
has meaningful access to the equitable remedy of injunctive relief. There
is also tension in the structure of patent remedies after eBay and the
subsequent case law. When a defendant is judicially determined to have
willfully infringed, if the defendant can show that it will be substantially
harmed if an injunction is issued or that it will put the patented technol-
ogy to better use than the patent holder, it may be allowed to continue to
infringe the patented technology. Concerns about patent holdout may be
solved without weakening the foundation of patent law. This next sec-
tion will demonstrate how this can be accomplished.
A. Property Rules Protect the Right to Exclude
Patents are (a species of) property, 279 and patent law is justified as
an institution with the ultimate goal of promoting innovation, with the
278. See id. ("The one in peril can take and pay, but after the peril passes, the property rule
reasserts itself.").
279. See Duffy, supra note 17, 1078 ("I, along with others, believe that intellectual property
should be treated as a species of property."); Mossoff, supra note 17, at 322 ("The status of
patents is undisputed: patents are property."); Smith, Intellectual Property as Property, supra note
189, at 1745 (arguing "that intellectual property's close relationship to property stems from the
role that information costs play in the delineation and enforcement of rights"). Yet there are some
scholars who believe that patent law stands on its own and is more akin to a public good than a
piece of property. See, e.g., Lemley, Free Riding, supra note 17, at 1075 (arguing that intellectual
property "no longer needs to turn to some broader area of legal theory to seek legitimacy" and that
there is no reason to analogize intellectual property to property); Sichelman, supra note 28, at 9,
11 (defending his view that patentees are private attorneys general and patent law is a public
regulatory regime). Smith finds that "[s]keptics of intellectual property rights criticize unjustified
formalistic use of property metaphors and doctrines and advocate fewer exclusive rights and
greater tailoring of the legal regime around valued uses." Smith, Intellectual Property as Property,
supra note 189, at 1756 (citing examples of "[s]keptics of intellectual property rights").
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parties within the patent system playing an integral role in the successful
functioning of the system. Accordingly, spending time focusing on the
actions and compensation of the parties within the patent system is just
one step scholars must take in efforts to achieve the optimal level of
investment in intellectual property.
Property rights are most often protected in the law by a property
rule.28° This is true even though the use of property rules in recent years
has received relatively little support in legal scholarship. 8 The gap
between the strong support for property rules in the law prior to eBay
and weak support for property rules in the legal academy is seemingly
demonstrative of a split between the courts and the academy.282 In patent
law, scholars are (rightfully) concerned that NPEs are strategically hold-
ing out when negotiating with potential users of their technology, as
well as waiting until their patent is almost expired to enforce their rights
to garner high damages from those in the same field.283
This line of literature was most recently furthered by scholars who
have either proposed a nuisance-type model for patent infringement or
who have argued that patent law is akin to nuisance law (where the once
property-rule regime is transitioning into a liability-rule regime, with the
focus on the utilities and reasonableness of the property use).
284
Although holdout behavior and strategic bargaining are two valuable
concerns in patent law, I argue here that these problems can be handled
without altering or giving up a patent holder's right to exclude.285
The framework of patent infringement remedies should be shifted
toward the structure of trespass. Both trespass and patent infringement
are strict liability regimes; a cause of action exists as soon as a party
steps into the boundary lines owned by the property holder. Although
the costs and mechanisms of defining boundary lines in patent law are
280. See Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 10, at 1723 (proposing a theory of
the advantages of property rules that seeks to account for "why property rules tend to be
associated with entitlements that we label 'property' ").
281. Id. at 1721-22 (arguing "that the preference for liability rules rests on certain overly
simple assumptions about how assets and activities are individuated and evaluated").
282. Id. at 1723 (describing the gap between law and theory in property).
283. See supra Section III.A.
284. See, e.g., Janet Freilich, Comment, A Nuisance Model for Patent Law, 2011 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. &. POL' 329, 331 (2011) (arguing "that the patent system should be reformed by creating
a nuisance-type model for intellectual property" that "would build off the real property system of
private nuisance, which encourages courts to conduct a test that balances harm and utility, both to
the parties and to society, to determine whether damages or an injunction would be the better
remedy"); Newman, supra note 8, at 105.
285. This right to exclude "is the obvious place to begin because it is a central component of
any system of private property." Epstein, Disintegration, supra note 17, at 486 ("Indeed, the fight
to exclusive possession and use is the only element of the traditional bundle of property rights that
receives full-fledged constitutional protection under the Takings Clause.").
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higher and more costly due to the nature of patent claims (as opposed to
a fence), a party is liable for its encroachment regardless of knowledge
or intention of crossing those boundary lines.286 Further, just like in the
law of trespass, an infringer is held responsible for its actions even if the
damage caused is minimal. Even though injunctions are arguably less
requested and less needed in the law of trespass due to the exactness of
the boundary lines and nature of the harm, the tool of injunctive relief
remains valuable.
287
The most important aspect of injunctive relief is with respect to
future harms: "[I]t keeps open the channels for voluntary exchange.
288
Injunctive relief forces interested users of the patented technology to
negotiate directly with the property owner and in theory "mak[es] it
impossible for individuals to circumvent the basic rules of property law
for their short-term private advantage." 289 This is furthered by the added
layer of protection of enhanced damages under the Patent Act. If the
taking is deemed willful, the court has the option of awarding both an
injunction and damages above the base monetary remedies of lost profits
or reasonable royalties.
In regard to the importance of injunctive relief in trespass, "[w]hy
would third parties even attempt to negotiate with owners and risk a
negative answer when they can simply take matters into their own
hands, act unilaterally, and pay the official market price after the
fact?" 29 0 Likewise, property rules in patent law encourage parties to
interact and reach a mutually beneficial bargain. Take away the paten-
tee's right to be protected by a property rule (enforced through injunc-
tive relief and enhanced damages) and the system becomes weaker.
Patentees will seemingly have less of an incentive to invest in and seek
286. See id. at 486-87 (recognizing that "[t]he sharp boundary lines in physical space cannot
be duplicated with intellectual property" and that "[t]he fuzzy boundaries inherent in the
description of patent claims invite, of course, new entrants to game the system by coming as close
to the original patent description without crossing the line"). Epstein further explains that there is
not a strong argument for unawareness in patent law's strict liability system, stating: "it would be
easy in a strict liability regime to show some solicitude to those who came close to the line that
they did not cross. But all patent claims are constructed by professionals who have an intimate
knowledge of the relevant space." Id. at 487.
287. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 233, at 1824-26 (explaining that the law of
trespass often does not provide the same level of protection ex post the trespass versus the
protection the owner enjoys ex ante the trespass, and arguing for "[p]ropertized compensation
[that] seeks to reinstate, to the extent feasible, the owner's right to exclude others and to set any
price for occupation and use of her property").
288. Epstein, Disintegration, supra note 17, at 488 (finding that this is the "best answer" to
why the Federal Circuit adopted a presumption in favor of granting injunctions in patent cases).
289. Id. at 488. This fundamental rule in property law prevents "the exercise of a private power
of eminent domain" and an injunction "prevents the circumvention of voluntary transactions that
work to the benefit of both sides." Id. at 488-89.
290. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 233, at 1825.
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protection from patented inventions. Further, patentees may be less
likely to share their technology because one of the major pieces of evi-
dence courts analyze ex post eBay in deciding whether to grant injunc-
tive relief or not is whether the patentee regularly licensed its technology
and for what price. Parties need to have expectations managed effec-
tively, and this is most easily and historically done in patent law by
reestablishing the right to exclude after infringement to the majority of
patentees.
Liability rules and nuisance law do not achieve this same level of
expectation and incentive to negotiate and play by the rules. Smith has
explained that "[u]nder a liability rule, a would-be taker or user can vio-
late the entitlement and pay officially determined damages, as opposed
to facing injunctions or punitive damages under a property rule that pro-
tects an owner's right to insist on a voluntary transaction or no transac-
tion at all."29 This taker has a private power of eminent domain and is
able to seek out undervalued or developed technology and pay the cur-
rent market price instead of what the patent holder believes it will be
worth once fully developed. 292 This is in direct contradiction with patent
law, where if an infringer willfully makes, uses, or sells patented tech-
nology it may be subject to enhanced damages that are aimed at punish-
ing and deterring future infringing actions. The strict liability structure
and the recognition of the harm, regardless of the amount of damages,
are also both inconsistent with the law of nuisance.
Further, nuisance law involves two property owners, where one
property owner invades the other property owner's space indirectly
through dust or noise. The invading property owner is not liable for such
invasion until it substantially and unreasonably interferes with the plain-
tiffs right to use her property.293 Because there are not two property
owners in patent law, the very basis for balancing the use and reasona-
bleness of such use of the property does not exist. This balancing of use
occurs in nuisance law because of the two equal, yet conflicting, prop-
erty rights at stake.294
Robert Merges has explained that the foundation of strong "prop-
291. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property, supra note 189, at 1757.
292. Cf Epstein, Disintegration, supra note 17, at 488-89 (discussing how an "injunction
prevents the exercise of a private power of eminent domain"). A liability rule therefore encourages
experts in the field to seek out patented technology that has not yet been introduced to the market
or fully implemented in a successful product, and have the ability to pay a market price that may
not take into account that in just another six months the patented technology will be valued at
several times the current amount. Of course the patentee arguably knows (or at least believes) this
to be true of her technology and so demands a price that the future infringer refuses to pay
knowing he can "take and pay later."
293. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821F, 822 (1979).
294. See Freilich, supra note 284, at 343.
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erty rule entitlements drive IPR [intellectual property rights] holders in
high transaction industries into repeat-play bargaining which leads to the
formation of CROs [private Collective Rights Organizations]." '95 For
example, patent holders voluntarily join patent pools in industries and
"contract around" potentially inefficient property rules.296 Merges
describes the growing phenomenon in which intellectual property hold-
ers join together, agree to give up their rights to injunctive relief, collec-
tively license their patents or copyrights, and split the profits.297
Recognizing that parties efficiently contract around property rules when
an injunction is not the end goal presents one more reason to have a
patent system based on property rules. Patent law may not need courts to
set licensing rates for it when parties are doing it themselves and already
avoiding potential problems of holdup. In a market economy, parties that
set the price for the entitlements are generally more trusted to do so at
the right price than courts or legislatures.298 The preference for property
rules over liability rules is significantly bolstered by Merges's evidence
that parties within the intellectual property system will come together
and avoid problems of holdup.299
So how can we decrease the tension in the patent remedies structure
and revert back to strong property rules after eBay and over five years of
developing case law that is moving in the wrong direction? In the next
section, I propose that the most realistic and helpful option at this point
is to accept eBay and work within the current framework to do what is
possible to shift the current trajectory of patent remedies.
B. Options After eBay
There are several possible approaches to decreasing the tension
within the structure of patent remedies. One response may be that we
should do nothing-that we simply should embrace the current path of
equitable relief. The thought here is that the direction of patent law
toward a liability rule is overdue and that for too long the patent system
has promoted sky-high awards. This response of "wait and see" is cer-
tainly the easiest to adopt, yet it is unlikely that under the evolving lia-
bility rule system the standard of willful infringement could be sustained
or the incentive to negotiate upfront with the patent holder before the
taking of the patented technology. A liability system encourages just the
295. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 12, at 1296.
296. See id. at 1340-42, 1357.
297. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 12, at 1319, 1340-42. For example,
copyright owners forego their injunctive rights and collectively license their rights to copyright
licensing organizations such as ASCAP and BMI. See id. at 1295.
298. See Lemley, Contracting Around, supra note 11, at 470.
299. See id. (discussing Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 13).
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opposite. Further, it seems there are few (if any) scholars that are com-
pletely satisfied with eBay. The two arguments serving as endpoints on
the spectrum of when to grant injunctive relief are that patentees should
always receive injunctive relief versus that patentees should never
receive injunction relief.
Most scholars are well within these endpoints. For example, John
Golden has argued against a near-categorical rule that denies patentees
in indirect competition (whether through commercialization itself or
licensing to a company that is in direct competition with the infringer)
the ability to receive an injunction.300 He explains that district courts
seem to be moving toward a "per se rule of discrimination based on a
patent holder's business model," and that such a per se rule "could act as
an undesirable drag on the efficiency and competitiveness of markets for
innovation." '' Golden further identifies the actors that are harmed by
this rule and states that "[b]y discouraging innovation, and the owner-
ship of rights in innovation, by independent inventors, universities, tech-
nology start-ups, research-oriented spin-offs, and patent holding
companies, a categorically discriminatory market for patent rights may
slow, rather than promote, progress. '"302
Epstein has criticized the eBay factors as not taking into account
the "serious institutional damage" that occurs when a court allows an
infringer to "circumvent the voluntary market by creating what is in
essence a compulsory license whose terms are set by a court, not the
parties."3 3 Epstein also points out flaws within the test itself, such as the
extremely similar first two factors-irreparable injury and inadequate
damages at law-and the unhelpfulness of the last two factors.30 4 He
finds that the third factor regarding relative hardship of the parties
requires the court to play a guessing game as to which party will suffer
the most harm.30 5 And as for the fourth factor-the impact of the injunc-
tion on the public-Epstein argues "[i]n order for this factor to carry real
weight, it is necessary to show that there will be cases in which the
injunction seems justified between the parties but will be denied because
of its adverse effects on third persons."30 6 Accordingly, he finds that the
300. Golden, supra note 5, at 2116.
301. Id. at 2117.
302. Id. (Golden persuasively states that "[elven a well-justified belief that patent rights may,
in some instances, produce excessive rewards does not necessarily justify devaluing those rights
whenever they are held by a broad class of patent owners").
303. Epstein, Disintegration, supra note 17, at 490.
304. id. at 490-91. See also Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 81, at 233 (noting that the
irreparable harm and inadequacy of legal remedies factors overlap).
305. Epstein, Disintegration, supra note 17, at 491.
306. Id. at 491.
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"touchstone" of a court's inquiry will be the irreparable harm factor.30 7
Other scholars have likewise found problems with eBay and have
generally argued that patent law should either deny more injunctions
30 8
or reframe the way that injunctive relief is currently being handled by
the district courts,3 "9 and that intellectual property may be more aptly
dubbed "intellectual liability."31 With these criticisms of eBay already
lodged, and the newly identified tension between courts using deterrence
and blameworthy language and allowing such an infringer to continue
using the patent, this first response is unsatisfactory.
Another response to eBay is to simply reject it and start anew. This
response may seem attractive at first glance given all of the complaints,
yet the harder question of course is what to replace it with. The
debates-past and current-between academics, reformers, and judges
demonstrate that there are many varying perspectives on not only how to
shape patent law, but also more fundamentally, on what the purpose and
focus of patent law should be. Putting differing views aside, there is a
more concrete problem with this option. eBay is deeply entrenched
within the court systems. In a recent article, Mark Gergen, John Golden,
and Henry Smith analyze the spreading (and perhaps unintentional)
influence of eBay.3 1' They demonstrate that federal courts across the
nation have adopted eBay and its rule change that stripped away the
presumption of injunctive relief following adjudication.31 2 This is true
not only for patent cases, but also for almost all types of cases (for
example, actions under federal anti-discrimination statutes and actions
based on diversity involving state tort, contract, or statutory law).3 13 And
while several courts have found eBay disruptive of many long-settled
presumptions,314 it does not seem realistic at this point to hope that this
spreading influence of eBay will be curtailed anytime soon. This leaves
the most satisfactory and feasible option to resolve the current tension
between equitable and injunctive remedies in the patent system: to work
within the existing law.
A positive starting point in the existing law is that there are several
situations that generally result in an award of injunctive relief for the
307. Id.
308. See Sichelman, supra note 28, at 13.
309. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 6, at 2035-37 (citing the potential problem of
patent holdout and arguing in favor of granting stays on permanent injunctions in cases where the
infringing party will be able to design around the patent).
310. See Crane, supra note 172, at 254.
311. See Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 81, at 205.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 215 & nn.51-54 (listing exemplary case law).
314. Id. at 215-16 (citing courts that have explicitly found eBay as disruptive to presumptions
such as a presumption of irreparable injury in light of continuing harms).
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patentee. These situations, representing a near per se award of injunctive
relief for the patent holder, occur when patent holders directly compete
with the accused infringers.3t5 This includes those in direct competition,
as well as those that exclusively license their patented technology to
another that competes with the infringer. However, this is just a starting
point because many patentees do not license their patent to just one com-
pany, and still many others are not in direct competition with their
infringer. Another issue that courts and scholars must be aware of ex
post eBay and the decline of the economy is that some inventors and
small companies (who may have attempted to commercialize their own
technology) may now choose to license or assign their patents to patent
holding companies that will then enforce these patent rights. Conse-
quently, a categorical prohibition against NPEs having access to equita-
ble relief is increasingly going to affect individual inventors and small
companies.
Although NPEs are most often viewed negatively, patent scholars
have also recently asserted that NPEs serve a useful role. For example,
scholars have recently argued that NPEs enhance innovation by creating
a market for patents and inventions to capital-poor inventors.3" 6 Simi-
larly, NPEs may "act as a market intermediary in the patent market" and
"provide liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to the pat-
ent markets-the same benefits securities dealers supply capital mar-
kets." '3 17 It is also important, especially with NPEs, to "distinguish
between a hold-up and aggressive, but legitimate, bargaining." '318 The
time-limited leverage granted to inventors by the Patent Act is a strong
incentive for innovation, and an integral part of that incentive is the abil-
ity to bargain hard and put oneself in the best position to extract value
from the patented technology.319
315. See TruePosition Inc. v. Andrew Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d 500, 505, 534 (D. Del. 2008)
(granting injunctive relief against a direct competitor); TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp.,
446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670-71 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (same). See also Brief Amici Curiae of 52
Intellectual Property Professors in Support of Petitioners at 9, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130) (identifying those that generally gamer injunctive relief
as the "patent owners who participate in the market, whether by selling the patented invention,
exclusively licensing it to someone else who sells it, or selling a product not covered by the patent
but which competes with the infringing product"). Mark A. Lemley was the principle author here,
with Richard Epstein, F. Scott Kieff, R. Polk Wagner, and David Teece writing a response brief.
See Epstein, Disintegration, supra note 17, at 491 n.128 (citing Brief of Various Law &
Economics Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-
130)).
316. Shrestha, supra note 5, at 117-18.
317. McDonough III, supra note 7, at 190. See also Marc Morgan, Stop Looking Under the
Bridge for Imaginary Creatures: A Comment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent
Troll, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 165, 172-76 (2008).
318. Layne-Farrar & Schmidt, supra note 18, at 1122.
319. See Newman, supra note 8, at 66.
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I am not advocating in this Article for or against NPEs, but there is
a concern that courts are allowing too much change in patent law
because of overstated concerns about NPEs and holdout behavior.32 ° As
Epstein has explained, "[n]othing in the traditional principles of equity
requires the radical revision of the right to exclude that eBay seems to
invite."'321 The current path of eBay is forcing inventors to make busi-
ness decisions based on a right that has historically been granted by the
Patent Act. Yet why should a patentee's use of its patent dictate the type
of relief it will receive if the patent is infringed? Simply:
There is no reason to tilt the willingness to license, or the choice of
licensees, by the selective availability of injunctive relief. Whether a
patentee has one patent or a thousand in its portfolio, the choice of
legal relief should never depend on how a patentee chooses to exploit
his invention.322
Within the law of eBay and its equitable principles, there is room to alter
this trajectory and regain the strength of property rules in the patent
system.323 Instead of relying on a forced license, the next section argues
that courts should turn to readily available mechanisms when there is
concern about the particular behavior of a patent holder. This will enable
courts to reframe patent remedies to resemble that of the traditional,
long-standing structure of trespass with a new emphasis and awareness
of potential for public harm.
C. Ordering an Incomplete Privilege or Stay
Courts can act within the current framework of eBay and still alle-
viate the tension between equitable and punitive damages. In order to do
this, patent law needs to shift away from the current nuisance-like struc-
ture, in which courts are engaging in an analysis of what is the most
reasonable and efficient use of the patented technology. This current
framework can be bettered by courts in at least two ways: by the
increased use and broadening of an incomplete privilege and by the
increased use of court-ordered stays. These changes will decrease the
perceived need to deny injunctive relief and take a step away from the
near categorical denial of injunctive relief when the patentee is an NPE
320. See Epstein, Disintegration, supra note 17, at 493-94 ("The case of the tiny patent[ee]
who exercises the exorbitant holdup does need some attention at the margins, but it should never
be the tail that wags the patent dog.").
321. Id. at 494.
322. Id. at 493 ("The make-or-license decision should not be skewed by making the strong
remedy dependent on choosing one form of business transaction.").
323. I am not arguing that patent law be morphed into something that it never was. For
example, the short term of the patent is an important necessity that I am not seeking to alter.
Rather, my proposal works within the current patent laws and understanding of property rights.
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or an indirect competitor. This reframing will confirm the message of
eBay-hold out and you will not be allowed to keep out-while also
clarifying that patent law is not most desirably governed by a liability
rule. A potential taker must abide by the property rule, no matter the size
of the company or the use of the patented technology, and negotiate up
front with the patent holder at all possible times.
The first mechanism is a grant of an incomplete privilege, akin to
the material discussed above regarding public and private necessity.
Under this incomplete privilege, the court would allow the defendant to
use the patented technology when patentee behavior threatens to cause
unreasonable harm to the public. This harm most likely will occur in the
following ways: by causing the public to lose access to technology it is
already using or by causing significant economic waste in light of the
disproportionate gain to the patent holder compared to the infringer.
While the defendant continues to use the technology, it must continue to
likewise pay for its infringement at the adjudicated reasonable royalty or
a price agreed upon by the patentee and infringer.324 This relief is simi-
lar to that of a compulsory license and what courts post-eBay are cur-
rently doing, yet this approach gets to this relief less often and without
discarding the historically valued right to exclude.
A "nightmare example" of a patent holder that causes significant
and unreasonable harm is where a single patent holder is able to pull
products off the shelf that the public is already widely using-for exam-
ple, the iPad.325 This theoretically could happen, and while it is cringe-
worthy thinking about the possibility of having iPads suddenly stripped
from the public's possession, or at least rendered inoperable or unsup-
ported, "it is instructive that there is no decided case in the Federal Cir-
cuit that has granted an injunction under such extreme conditions.1
326
There is a recent case that was somewhat close to creating this sort
of nightmare in the field of hybrid car technology. With a little manipu-
lation, the facts of Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. could tell the story
of a patentee who used its patent to unreasonably and significantly harm
the public.327 It is a case where the court would use the mechanism of an
incomplete privilege to avoid an impending social nightmare. In the
actual case, the NPE plaintiff, Paice, wanted too much money in
Toyota's opinion to license Paice's patents covering hybrid electric
324. An example of this type is a compulsory license.
325. I use a very similar example of the "nightmare example" that Epstein has described. See
Epstein, Disintegration, supra note 17, at 490.
326. Id.
327. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-21 1-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *2-4
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (Paice 1), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(Paice 11).
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vehicle drive train technology. 328 Toyota and Paice discussed Toyota
licensing the patents, but negotiations broke down and Paice sued for
patent infringement. The jury found that Toyota infringed, but did not do
so willfully. 3 9 Paice then sought permanent injunctive relief, yet was
instead granted an ongoing royalty for every car that Toyota sold with
the infringing drive train technology. 330 The denial of injunctive relief
was affirmed by the Federal Circuit, which remanded the case to the
district court to determine how to set the price of each car that
infringed.331
In deciding to deny injunctive relief, the district court, affirmed by
the Federal Circuit, used the four-factor test of eBay.332 The district
court first found that Paice failed to demonstrate it would be irreparably
harmed without an injunction.333 This was because Paice did not show
that it was in direct competition with Toyota, that ongoing royalties
would harm its goodwill or reputation, or that its licensing program had
or would in the future be harmed by adding another licensee to it.334 The
district court further found that monetary damages were relatively easily
calculable and that adding more royalties to Paice's licensing program
would affirm its rights to the patented technology just as well as an
injunction would affirm the rights to the patented technology.335 The
district court noted that as to the third factor, the balancing of hardships,
there would be significant time, effort, and disruption to Toyota's busi-
ness if an injunction were issued.336 In light of the Patent Act's ultimate
goal to promote innovation, the court explained that "[t]he burgeoning
hybrid market could also be stifled. ' 337 A bit in contradiction, the court
then found Toyota's argument unpersuasive under the public interest
factor: that the public would suffer a great loss if Toyota were enjoined
from using this particular patented technology. 338 The court cited as its
reason that other hybrid cars were available.339
Overall, however, the court was convinced that Toyota should be
328. See Paice I, 504 F.3d at 1296-99.
329. See Paice 1, 2006 WL 2385139 at *1.
330. Paice 1, 2006 WL 2385139 at *6.
331. See Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 620, 631 (E.D. Tex. 2009) (Paice
III).
332. Paice 1, 2006 WL 2385139 at *1.
333. Id. at *4-5.
334. Id. (finding that there was "evidence in the record .. that potential licensees may have
declined business deals because of Plaintiffs misrepresentations and improper business tactics,"
not because of the prospect that Toyota would acquire a licensee from it).
335. See id. at *5.






allowed to continue to infringe despite Paice's requests. 340 This example
of injunctive relief is less troubling than eBay, z4 , or i4i because Toyota
was not a willful infringer. Further, Toyota did not purport to have
designed around the patent like eBay allegedly had, and Microsoft said it
was close to in its new versions of its software in z4 and i4i. Perhaps a
counter argument here is that the damages awarded in this case were
relatively small-$4,269,950 in compensatory fees-with more to be
awarded for each car that infringed during the remaining life of the pat-
ent that was found to be valid and infringed.34' These are not the amount
of damages that come to mind in the "nightmare case" of patent holdout,
yet perhaps the design-around cost and recall cost would hit a higher,
more concerning number.
Now if the facts were changed to Toyota being the only hybrid
manufacturer in the market, or if this case occurred a decade or two
earlier when hybrid cars were still in the infancy stages, the holdup
potential in this field of technology would be significantly greater. With
these manipulated facts, a denial of a permanent injunctive relief would
prevent the stalling of hybrid technology. Significantly, however, these
were not the facts of this case and while the problem of tension between
equitable relief and enhanced damages did not exist, the fundamentals of
patent law were altered to gain a short-term advantage. This created poor
precedent and has helped to open the door for future cases to deny
injunctive relief when patentees are in fact using their patented
technology.
I posit that the law of incomplete privilege would grant this same
advantage of not creating economic waste and stall in hybrid vehicle
innovation. Accordingly, this long-standing property framework is
equipped "to handle the case that is calculated to cause it [patent law]
the greatest embarrassment. ' 34 The court would use a mechanism akin
to that demonstrated in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. The
court in essence would permit Toyota, through an incomplete privilege
based on the patentee's unreasonable and harmful use of the patent, to
have a grace period during which Toyota would have time to create a
component that effectively designed around the minor component cov-
ered by the patent. This is a case-by-case analysis that is only needed in
the rarest cases where the public's general welfare is at stake.
340. See id.
341. See Paice III, 609 F. Supp. 2d at 622.
342. Epstein, Disintegration, supra note 17, at 490 (explaining that "[i]t would have been quite
possible for the Supreme Court to have affirmed the Federal Circuit rule by announcing that these
cases of massively disparate stakes were inappropriate for injunctive relief .... [and that] [t]he
traditional framework [of necessity] appears to be able to handle" the patent holdout cases that
scholars are most concerned about).
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The second proposed mechanism available for a court's use is the
grant of a court-ordered stay. This is most likely to be invoked by the
parties or the court because the patent at issue is going through a reex-
amination at the USPTO or because the defendant needs a short grace
period to be able to comply with the injunction order. There are several
early cases after eBay where a stay could have been used to send the
message to patent holders that they would not be allowed to holdup
innovation, while still maintaining the integrity of the patent system.
The district court case of eBay on remand is exemplary.
One of the new facts the district court addressed after the Supreme
Court's remand was that the USPTO granted eBay's request for patent
reexamination of the patents-in-suit-the '265 and the '051."' This
occurred while the appeal of the original district court's opinion was
pending at the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court.3 ' By the time of the
remand to the district court, the USPTO issued non-final office actions
indicating that both patents were invalid as obvious.3 45 Every claim of
the '265 patent was rejected twice in non-final actions as obvious.34 6
The reexamination of the '051 resulted in the claims being similarly
rejected as obvious, although MercExchange's response to the non-final
action included a submission of more claims that the USPTO
examined. 347 These additional claims were withdrawn, but at the time of
the opinion of the district court it appeared that a couple of the original
claims might indeed survive the reexamination (and a second reexami-
nation was likely to occur).348
Based upon the status of these reexaminations, paired with a jury
finding of validity and infringement of the '265 patent and no jury trial
on the '051 patent, the district court stayed the proceedings only in
regard to the '051 patent.349 Consequently, it continued in assessing
whether to issue an injunction as to the '265 patent.350 In arriving at this
conclusion, the district court cited supporting precedent that staying dur-
ing a parallel reexamination will "avoid inconsistent results, narrow the
issues, obtain guidance from the PTO, or simply ... avoid the needless
waste of judicial resources, especially if the evidence suggests that the
343. See MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 560 (E.D. Va. 2007).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 560 After a final office action of invalidity, the patentee may appeal to the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences and ultimately to the Federal Circuit. Id. at 562-63.
346. Id. at 561 n.1, 563.
347. Id. at 561, n.l.
348. Id. (explaining that "it now appears that a handful of the '051 patent's original claims may
ultimately survive the initial reexamination; however, a second reexamination regarding the few
surviving claims was recently granted by the PTO.").
349. See id. at 563, 565, 567.
350. See id. at 568.
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patents-in-suit will not survive reexamination. 351 The problem here is
that the district court was not comfortable overlooking the overwhelm-
ing majority of case law that demonstrated that stays are most frequently
granted prior to trial, not after trial.3 52 The district court was concerned
that if it granted the stay of the '265 patent after the jury found it valid
and infringed (affirmed by the Federal Circuit) that it "would create the
incentive for adjudicated infringers to seek to circumvent an otherwise
enforceable jury verdict by utilizing an alternate forum." '3 53
The district court's analysis here was thorough and thoughtful, yet
the district court did not appear to consider the fact that a stay could also
be used to delay the onset of an injunctive order. The defendant, eBay,
announced that it had successfully designed around the '265 patent and
was no longer infringing.3 54 The district court noted that it did not con-
sider this development because it had insufficient information before it
to fully explore eBay's contention of its successful design-around.3 5
The district court could have affirmed the patentee's right to exclude,
one that for the moment was valid and enforceable given the Federal
Circuit's affirmation of the validity of the '265 patent and infringement
by eBay, by granting an injunction and then staying the effective date
for a few months to give eBay and MercExchange a chance to contest (if
needed) the assertion of the successful design-around. This would also
have given the USPTO more time to issue a final action regarding the
'265 patent, and perhaps in the end render the same result to eBay.
Although MercExchange might be an unsympathetic plaintiff, the facts
of the case do not make this an exemplary case warranting such a drastic
change in how district courts award relief to all patent holders.
V. CONCLUSION
The court-ordered mechanisms of an incomplete privilege and stay
can reframe patent infringement remedies to become like that of a tres-
pass-like infringement model. This will allow courts to regain the strong
property protection in patent law, remain within the boundaries of eBay
v. MercExchange, and yet still be aware of and prepared for potential
holdup situations. Perhaps the next step here is providing guidance to
351. Id. at 563 (citing Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
352. See id.
353. Id. at 565 (explaining that "although the PTO may ultimately 'correct' a trial court by
determining that the patents-in-suit are invalid, this court need not subvert itself to the
administrative timetable based upon such possibility").
354. Id. at 575 n.16.
355. Id. at 561 n.2 (stating that "because the court does not have sufficient evidence before it to
fully explore such contention, the instant opinion is not premised upon such purported design-
around").
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courts regarding certain industries and types of patents that are more
likely to create consistent holdups in innovation. However, until that
research data is collected, studied, and presented, patent remedies can be
reshaped by district courts to decrease the current tension within the sys-
tem. A categorical approach to NPEs and patent holders in indirect com-
petition loses focus on the basic foundation of patent law. The current
categorical approach also fails to appreciate the aspect of social harm or
benefit of the equitable remedy. Courts should be focused not on the
infringer's harm or benefit when faced with injunctive relief, but rather
on the public's gain or loss.
